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 Today, the role that media technologies and actors play in the formation 
of opinion and social networks is changing and presents many new 
questions for media scholars. While media technologies have always 
played an important role in international conflict, today’s “network 
society” has dramatically increased the ways in which media technologies 
are utilized in conflicts, the number of media organizations producing 
and disseminating information during conflict, as well as the means 
to better monitor and understand mediated communications from afar. 
Accordingly, media organizations are increasingly being treated as 
“actors” within international conflicts, able to shape and refine opinions 
of people and even governments. 
Since CNN’s coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, satellite news 
broadcasters have popped up around the world, each with a slightly 
different take on international events. Narratives guiding the public’s 
understanding of events are increasingly and more easily contested, and 
thus the ‘battle’ to control the flow of information has become intense, 
particularly during times of conflict. As competition over the airwaves 
has increased, it has become especially difficult to discern under what 
circumstances particular broadcasters have influence, and among 
what audiences. With a plethora of news organizations broadcasting 
information around the world, it has become much easier for audiences 
to tune into the organization that is oftentimes aligned with their opinions 
and worldviews, a change in the newsscape that calls into question 
whether news organizations are actually educating audiences or rather 
providing people with information that is simply used to further their 
pre-existing opinions and attitudes. This is an especially troubling trend 
when read in the context of the prevalence and hardening of negative 
stereotypes about cultural “others.” 
Al-Jazeera English (AJE), launched in November 2006, presents 
an interesting test case to examine the role of satellite news in 
mediating today’s international conflicts. Hyped as “the voice of the 
South,” AJE promises to contain the technological capacity and the 
ideological wherewithal to provide new and productive fora for cross-
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8      executive SummAry
cultural communications. According to its proponents, AJE presents a 
tremendous opportunity for a new direction in the discourse of global 
newsflows. With its avowed promise of giving a “voice to the voiceless,” 
AJE could represent a new style of news media that challenges existing 
research regarding transnational media organizations and media and 
conflict scholarship more broadly. Below are the primary findings of our 
multi-method, multi-country study of AJE and employees. The findings 
are based on 597 surveys from the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Malaysia and Indonesia, several focus groups and 31 
interviews of AJE employees.  
Primary Findings
Al-Jazeera English viewers found it to function as a •	
“conciliatory media,” which is a media that is more likely to 
cover contentious issues in a way that contributes to creating 
an environment that is more conducive to cooperation, 
negotiation and reconciliation. Overall, viewers found that AJE 
was a conciliatory media, and the longer they had been watching 
AJE, the better they thought it was at fulfilling its conciliatory role. 
Conciliatory media, a term introduced in this research project, 
was determined based on how well AJE performed with regard 
to a number of journalistic criteria, including its ability to create 
space for the “mediatized recognition” of stories from groups 
that have been historically and/or are currently disenfranchised, a 
process that has been found to be an important step in the process 
towards reconciling cultural tensions.1 This process of mediatized 
recognition is at the heart of AJE’s mission, and is also reflected 
in how many of its journalists feel about the organization’s work. 
Moreover, by providing more depth and context to its stories, along 
with reasoned arguments on all sides of an issue, a conciliatory 
media is likely to induce more open thinking when it comes to 
considering other people’s perspectives. 
The more months viewers had been watching AJE, the less •	
dogmatic they were in their thinking. In this context, dogmatism 
refers to a “relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and 
disbeliefs about reality, organized around a central set of beliefs 
about absolute authority which, in turn, provides a framework for 
patterns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others.”2 
Previous research has demonstrated a positive correlation between 
levels of dogmatism and confrontational behavior in conflict 
9 mediAting conflict:  Aje And the PoSSibility of A conciliAtory mediA
situations.3 This finding was found to be significant amongst 
participants who relied heavily on AJE as their primary source for 
information and political behavior, as well as those who were less 
dependent on AJE. The lower levels of dogmatism associated with 
AJE viewership may open up viewers to becoming increasingly 
capable of navigating issues that have otherwise been seen as 
irreconcilable. Moreover, lower levels of dogmatism have been 
found to strongly relate to one’s willingness to engage and listen 
to competing information claims, a consequence that could be 
exceptionally helpful in combating perceptions of a “Clash of 
Civilizations.” This is particularly significant in light of our finding 
that viewers considered AJE to be a conciliatory media, and that 
the longer a viewer had tuned into AJE, the better they thought it 
was at fulfilling a conciliatory function. Not only did viewers think 
that AJE was effective at embodying the journalistic standards that 
we identified as essential for a news outlet to cover contentious 
issues in socially productive ways, but the longer they watched, the 
less dogmatic they were, thus providing further evidence that the 
concept of a conciliatory media can have tangible consequences on 
how people approach difficult issues. 
Viewers tune into international news for affirmation rather •	
than information. On a number of levels, the findings provided 
evidence that participants were tuning into international news 
media that they thought would further substantiate their opinions 
about U.S. policies and culture, and provide them with information 
regarding the international issues of concern that they felt should 
be prioritized. For example, the study found a strong relationship 
between the participants’ attitudes toward the U.S. policies and 
culture and the particular broadcaster they depended on for news 
and information. Respondents who were dependent on BBC World 
and especially on CNNI were more supportive of U.S. foreign 
policy generally. Moreover, those dependent on BBC World 
were more favorable to American cultural values, while those 
dependent on CNNI were more likely to support America’s war 
on terror. Participants dependent on CNNI were more likely to 
support U.S. policy in Iraq and U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, while those dependent on AJE were more critical 
of both. In other words, viewers use the media to get affirmed 
rather than to get informed. For example, the viewers who oppose 
the U.S. policies in Iraq and Palestine may be more dependent on 
AJE as a source of information in that it will likely provide them 
with information to further substantiate their already established 
10      executive SummAry
opinion. Similarly, viewers who support the U.S. foreign policy 
may consider themselves dependent on CNNI since they believe 
its reporting operates within an ideology that is similar to theirs. 
Importantly, while viewers likely choose to watch international 
news broadcasters that will tell stories in ways that reinforce their 
opinions, we found that the more frequently a participant watched 
AJE, the less supportive they were of U.S. policy towards the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Similarly, the longer a participant had 
been tuning into AJE, the more critical they were of U.S. policy 
in Iraq. Thus, while the news media are unlikely to change one’s 
opinion on politically salient issues, it may often be the case that 
they do reinforce and deepen already held opinions. 
This study cautiously approaches the conciliatory potential of AJE and 
its influence. In terms of news media today, AJE is an anomaly when it 
comes to its role, mission and identity. It stands out from its competitors 
in that it presents a challenge to the existing paradigms guiding 
international news broadcasters. It is neither dominated by geopolitical 
nor commercial interests, and is the first of its kind to have the resources, 
mission and journalistic capacity to reach out to ideologically and 
politically similar audiences throughout the world. It both represents a 
challenge to “the myth of the mediated centre,” while also providing a 
test case for examining whether the “increased density in media flows…
necessarily translates into increased media power.”4 The findings confirm 
that people are drawn to news media that help them connect with others 
who share similar stories, a process that provides them with a sense of 
social stability. Yet, it is also clear that AJE is doing something right. Our 
finding that AJE was seen as a conciliatory media, and that the longer a 
viewer watched, the less dogmatic they were in their thinking provides 
hope in a world in desperate need of much cross-cultural reconciliation. 
Moving forward, questions of identity construction, promotion and 
identification are central to analyzing and understanding how media 
become trusted means for accessing information, and thus influential, in 
today’s media environment. 
 “The media is a double-edged sword. It can be a frightful weapon 
of violence when it propagates messages of intolerance or 
disinformation…[or] it can be an instrument of conflict resolution, 
when the information it presents is reliable, respects human rights, 
and represents diverse views.”5
The end of the 20th century witnessed dramatic changes in the structure, 
scope and depth of media across the globe. Not only have the number of 
media outlets expanded, especially in newly developing countries, but 
the legal and physical constraints that had previously limited the ability 
of media organizations to speak freely about sensitive politics have 
changed, resulting in a proliferation of information in many previously 
closed societies. Technological change has given people and institutions 
the ability to instantaneously broadcast local events to the world, 
while simultaneously watching and learning about far away events and 
cultures.6 
Today’s expanded role of media in society has presented newly 
formed challenges, especially in the context of international conflict. 
While media technologies have always played a role in international 
conflict, today’s “network society” has dramatically increased the ways 
in which media technologies are utilized in conflicts, the number of 
media organizations producing and disseminating information during 
conflict, as well as the means to better monitor and understand mediated 
communications from afar.7 It is along these lines that Philip Seib 
argues that “the connectivity of new media is superseding the traditional 
connections that have brought identity and structure to global politics.”8 
Tumber and Webster (2006) describe the changes in terms of a move 
from the traditional forms of “industrial war” towards mass-mediated 
conflicts, or “information wars,” placing the varied media outlets and 
technologies at the center of discussions of how to best navigate and 
understand contemporary international conflict.9  In short, they argue 
that military assets alone no longer govern the outcome of international 
conflict, and that success and failure are increasingly dependent on 
controlling the flow of information and the associated “hearts and 
minds” of the global citizenry.10  Accordingly, media organizations are 
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12      the riSe of mASS-mediAted conflict
increasingly being treated as “actors” within international conflicts, able 
to shape and refine opinions of people and even governments. 
Moreover, today’s expanded access to and competition within the 
global information sphere have made increasingly clear the different and 
often competing ways in which the mass media present international 
events. In 1991, at the outset of the first Gulf War, CNN dominated the 
global newsflow with its live coverage of the conflict and advanced 
presentation style. Carried both globally via the CNN satellite channel, 
as well as rebroadcast by many local and regional news providers, CNN’s 
coverage controlled the narrative which most saw and thought about the 
conflict. CNN’s domination of the world’s understanding of the war and 
its dependence on the U.S. military for access and information, resulted 
in a relatively large coalition of supporters for the invasion, both amongst 
governments and people in the region.11 While counter-narratives existed, 
they were obscured, and did not carry with them the weight of live and 
sensationally dramatic images of the Coalition’s victory over Saddam 
Hussein.
Today, rather than having a single network dominating the international 
newsscape, satellite news broadcasters have popped up around the world, 
each with a slightly different take on international events. Narratives 
guiding the public’s understanding of events are increasingly and more 
easily contested, and thus the ‘battle’ to control the flow of information 
has become intense, particularly during times of conflict.  As competition 
over the airwaves has increased, it has become especially difficult to 
discern under what circumstances particular broadcasters have influence, 
and among what audiences. With a plethora of news organizations 
broadcasting information around the world, it has become much easier 
for audiences to tune into the organization that is oftentimes aligned with 
their opinions and worldviews, a change in the newsscape that calls into 
question whether news organizations are actually educating audiences or 
rather providing people with information that is simply used to further 
their pre-existing opinions and attitudes.
 Coverage of today’s conflicts is dominated by a style of ‘war journalism.’ 
Mass media are both structurally and institutionally inclined to offer 
“escalation-oriented conflict coverage.”12 As Tehranian (2002) notes, “the 
world’s media are still dominated by state and corporate organizations, 
tied to the logics of commodity and identity fetishism. Such media 
generate political or commercial propaganda that constructs hostile 
images of the Other while creating a ‘global fishbowl’ whereby the 
excesses of the world’s wealthiest are on tantalizing display to the vast 
numbers of desperately poor.”13  Along the same lines, Shinar (2003) 
argues that the media’s professional standards, which thrive on drama, 
sensationalism and emotions, are more compatible with war than with 
peace: “War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with 
heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, 
and satisfies news-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, 
simplicity, action, personalization, and results.”14
Similarly, Gadi Wolfsfeld (1997) has highlighted several reasons 
why the media principles are contradictory to the peace principles: “A 
peace process is complicated; journalists demand simplicity. A peace 
process takes time to unfold and develop; journalists demand immediate 
results.  Most of the peace process is marked by dull, tedious negotiations; 
journalists require drama.  A successful peace process leads to a reduction 
in tensions; journalists focus on conflict. Many of the most significant 
developments within a peace process must take place in secret behind 
closed doors; journalists demand information and access.”15  Moreover, 
DayaThussu (2003) argues that the continuous demand for news in 
an environment that is dominated by 24/7 satellite television had led 
to “sensationalization and trivialization of often complex stories and a 
temptation to highlight the entertainment value of news.”16  Knowing 
that audiences are likely to tune in more often in times of conflict, news 
media have little incentive to locate and focus on areas of cooperation in 
conflicts, and often overstate the proclivity for “violence to break out at 
any moment” in order to maintain viewership and audience attention.17
Moreover, rather than speaking to and informing a multiplicity of 
audiences, today’s broadcasters are often mostly targeting particular 
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14      WAr journAliSm And A “clASh of civilizAtionS”
segments of people, relying on cultural mores and political and historical 
myths in contextualizing international events.  This reality was made 
especially clear in the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, where American 
and British media relied on a narrative of national security in justifying 
the necessity of invading Baghdad while many Arab satellite broadcasters 
framed the invasion as another example of Western imperialism and 
colonialism.  Recent scholarship found that news media, including new 
news media (websites) continue to cover war in terms of reflecting the 
“dominant national frames” as well as the “dominant national public 
discourses.”18  Thus despite the cosmopolitan hopes of an increasingly 
global media, media today continue to reflect and speak to particular 
“national discourses,” with little regard to each other.  
This phenomenon is perhaps best explained using el-Nawawy and 
Iskandar’s (2003) concept of “contextual objectivity,” a term used to 
describe the necessity of television and media to present stories in a 
fashion that is somewhat impartial yet sensitive to local sensibilities.19 
Applied in the context of Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the war in Iraq, el-
Nawawy and Iskandar acknowledge bias, but argue that it is an audience-
centered bias that does not deviate from the facts of the event and is no 
greater than the Western-tilt that is seen in most American media.  Simply 
put, they argue that all media deviate from the standard of objectivity by 
framing the facts of a given situation in ways that are socially accepted 
and expected amongst their particular audiences.  Interestingly, in their 
multinational content analysis of six networks’ coverage of the war in 
Iraq, Aday, Livingston and Herbert (2005) found significant evidence to 
substantiate the existence of such contextual objectivity in both Western 
and Arab media outlets: “When a network ran an unbalanced story, it 
was inevitably in the direction consistent with its culture of origin, with 
Al-Jazeera’s violations of the objective norm being critical of the war 
and the American networks slanting toward a more positive view.”20  
Thus, in times of war, today’s mainstream media often tailor their 
coverage in ways that construct an ideologically aligned narrative that 
reinforces the attitudes and opinions of their target national or regional 
audiences.  Sadly, this has resulted in “a de facto adoption of Samuel 
Huntington’s theory” of an inevitable “Clash of Civilizations.”21 
Outlined in 1993 in an article in Foreign Affairs, Huntington argues for 
the existence of “seven or eight” different civilizations whose clashes 
would “dominate global politics.”  Huntington contends that, “culture and 
cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, 
are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the 
post-Cold War world.”22  Central to Huntington’s clash thesis is the 
argument that the processes of globalization are increasing the propensity 
for tension and conflict between civilizations. As traditional sources of 
15 mediAting conflict:  Aje And the PoSSibility of A conciliAtory mediA
identity – the nation-state in particular – become less cogent, and as 
cross-cultural interactions become more intense, people will become 
increasingly bound to their civilizational identity, and thus critical of 
other civilizations that challenge their social norms and cultural mores. 
Accordingly, Huntington concludes, “the fault lines between civilizations 
will be the battle lines of the future.”23 
According to Seib (2004), the clash theory had immediate appeal 
to both newsmakers and policymakers in the West.  Huntington’s clash 
thesis offered an explanation for the emergence of a new and uncertain 
international order, and more importantly, an explanation that was 
ideologically and structurally similar to that of the Cold War. Huntington 
isolates a particular confrontation – one between the “Western” and 
“Islamic” civilizations – that will dominate international politics well 
into the 21st century.  The thesis thus offered Western policymakers 
and journalists a simple us-versus-them narrative that allowed for the 
continued binary and simplistic framing that had been so effective at 
mobilizing the American public during the Cold War.24
Combined, this de facto adoption of Huntington’s theory presents 
an additional obstacle to the media’s ability to facilitate reconciliation 
and peace building through televised news.  Moreover, it represents “a 
serious threat to peace in the globalized world of the 21st century.”25 The 
risk of dependence on international media that likely fosters attitudes of 
fear and hate underscores the necessity of an approach towards studying 
the role of media in conflict through the lens of collective identity: 
“When media representations enter into fields of conflict structured by 
deep-seated inequalities and entrenched identities, they can become 
inextricably fused with them, exacerbating intensities and contributing 
to destructive impacts.”26 

The rise of the importance of information in the conduct of war has 
resulted in increased attention to the role that media institutions and 
technologies, the principal conduits of information, have in conflict.  More 
specifically, scholarship has turned towards looking at the particular ways 
in which the different levels of media, i.e. from local to transnational and 
global, can influence the conduct of and negotiations regarding war.  While 
most acknowledge the increased importance of media in the conduct and 
outcome of conflict, few have offered systematic theories explaining the 
conditions governing the direction of the relationship between media and 
war.  In an effort to synthesize existing work on the relationship between 
media and conflict, Eytan Gilboa (2006) argues for a new framework 
to examine the relationship between media and conflict, suggesting that 
scholars need to investigate the specific influence that different media 
can have at each stage of conflict: prevention, management, resolution 
and reconciliation. Accordingly, at each level of the conflict, media have 
specific functions and dysfunctions, all of which collectively influence 
the public attitudes, negotiations and policies that guide the initiation, 
conduct and resolution of wars. Some of the functions and dysfunctions 
of media in the four stages of conflict include: awareness, apprehension, 
learning, mobilization, instigating opposition, perceptions of legitimacy 
or illegitimacy, confidence building and destruction, dramatization and 
sensationalizing, and the creation of realistic or high expectations. 
Gilboa’s framework, more so than that of previous scholars who argued 
for peace journalism, preventative journalism, telediplomacy, and 
even media intervention, offers a promising method for evaluating the 
different effects that particular media have during the discreet phases of 
conflict.27
Similarly, in an effort to expand research on the role of media and 
conflict, Wolfsfeld (2004) examines the role that media play in the 
construction of a peace process. Through an investigation of the Oslo 
peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, the peace process 
between Israel and Jordan, and the Good Friday Agreement in Northern 
Ireland, Wolfsfeld proposes four primary ways in which media can 
influence the path to peace: (1) defining the political atmosphere; (2) 
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determining the nature of the debate about a peace process; (3) influencing 
the antagonists’ strategy and behavior; and (4) influencing the public 
standing and legitimacy of antagonists involved.28  The investigation 
finds that there are many structural and cultural factors that encourage 
media to play a counter-productive role in the peace-making process, but 
that there are possibilities for success, perhaps best exemplified by the 
media in Northern Ireland. Wolfsfeld provides a useful analytic model 
for monitoring and evaluating the role of media in the specific processes 
leading up to a negotiated peace agreement, assuming the existence of 
a discrete group of actors whose stakes and interests in conflict can be 
identified.29 
Yet, the nature of today’s War on Terror, and its close associate, the 
battle for the “hearts and minds of the Arab world,” provide an analytical 
challenge to existing frameworks for analyzing media and conflict.  While 
it is the case that many conflicts continue to go through clear phases, and 
where understanding the role of media at each “stage” of the conflict 
offers a productive method for understanding the changing relationship 
between media and war (especially in the context of ‘hot wars’), today’s 
War on Terror does not fit neatly into the categories of analysis proposed by 
Gilboa, Wolfsfeld, and others. Interestingly, theoretical work explaining 
the media’s influence on conflict rarely tackles the question of cross-
cultural compatibility, the consequence that cultural antagonisms can 
have in the conflict and peace making processes, and most importantly, 
what, if anything, the media can do to minimize the negative influences 
that contrasting cultural identities have on the path to reconciliation.30
Perhaps due to the ambiguous scope of the current War on Terror, 
and the corresponding scope and significance of its effects, it is difficult 
to discern whether it is in any particular “stage” at any given point, who 
the primary actors involved are, and whether or not it can actually be 
going through two different “stages” in two different places at the same 
time. Moreover, its precise beginning is an open question as well; while 
the intensity of the War on Terror certainly increased after the events of 
September 11th, 2001, the attacks themselves were consequences of a 
series of policies and ideologies that are essential factors in understanding 
our current conflict.  In fact, the War on Terror, similar to the Cold War 
before it, exemplifies the importance of examining the role of media not 
only in its coverage and investigation of the material aspects of war, but 
also in the construction and propagation of the underlying ideologies 
that are so influential in shaping the socio-political environments that 
can result in conflict.31 Breaking down a conflict into specific stages, and 
examining each in isolation, or even as a sequence can only yield partial 
answers that are insufficient for understanding the relationship between 
media and conflict in the 21st century. Thus, scholars must continue to 
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expand their conceptualizations of conflict in order to incorporate the 
many socio-political influences and conversations that are critical both 
at the onset and continuation of violent conflict.32
In the face of this challenge, scholars have argued for a new form 
of journalism – peace journalism – as a means of “de-escalation-
oriented conflict coverage.”33 Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) define peace 
journalism as that which takes place “when editors and reporters make 
choices – of what stories to report and about how to report them – that 
create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent 
responses to conflict.”34  Galtung (2002), a pioneer in the field of peace 
journalism studies, argues that media in times of conflict should focus 
on “conflict transformation,” a move that requires journalists that are 
empathetic and understanding; able to provide a platform for all parties 
and voices to express themselves; and focus on the negative impact of 
violence, such as damage and trauma.35 Similarly, in his study of the 
role of media in the buildup to and falling apart of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Oslo accords, Wolfsfeld (2004) notes that it is the responsibility of 
reporters in the war zones “to provide as much information as possible 
about the roots of the problem and to encourage a rational public debate 
concerning the various options for ending it.” Wolfsfeld explains that, at 
times, encouraging rational deliberation amongst alienated groups can 
encourage all parties to refrain from escalating violence and engage in 
thoughtful consideration of ways to end the conflict.36
It is important to note that peace journalism was accused of encouraging 
journalists to “get involved” in the stories they are covering and trying 
to advocate an agenda at the expense of being objective.37 Even though 
objectivity has often been regarded as an essential journalistic value, 
several contemporary scholars have considered absolute objectivity to 
be a myth.38 Maintaining journalistic objectivity can be particularly hard 
in situations where “…editors and reporters are caught up, whether they 
like it or not, in the loops and coils of conflict and political process.”39 
In this context, Bell (1997) said: “When I report from the war zones, or 
anywhere else, I do so with all the fairness and impartiality I can muster,…
but using my eyes and ears and mind and accumulated experience, which 
are surely the very essence of the subjective.”40
It is also important to note that peace journalism authors are not 
calling for journalists to sanitize their coverage of conflicts, nor focus 
solely on calls for peace and cooperation. Rather, advocates argue that 
journalists describe violence in terms of its political, economic and 
social motivations, rather than a natural or inevitable consequence of 
otherwise uncontrollable events. By exposing violence as either a dire 
or irresponsible choice for dealing with an existing conflict, peace 
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journalists can encourage non-violent responses to conflicts that are 
otherwise viewed through a highly politicized lens.41
Yet, as of now, peace journalism is neither a tested means to reduce 
violent tensions in the world, nor has it been adopted by many, if any, 
mainstream or even mass-consumed media outlets.  One of the major 
weaknesses in the literature is a failure amongst peace-journalism 
scholars to consider the roles that collective identity – religious, ethnic, 
national and transnational – can have on the propensity for groups to 
either take to violence or consider non-violent solutions to conflicts. This 
weakness in the literature is especially problematic given the growing 
area of scholarship examining the role that media – especially electronic 
and new media – can have on the constitution and wherewithal of 
collective identities.42
One way that peace journalism scholars could integrate the role of 
identity into their work is through the use of the concept of the ‘politics 
of recognition.’  Developed by Charles Taylor (1994), the politics 
of recognition draws from the Hegelian concepts of consciousness 
and the ideal reciprocal relationship and suggests that personal and 
collective identities are shaped and impacted both by social recognition 
and validation, and, perhaps more importantly, by misrecognition or 
nonrecognition:
“A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, 
sometimes the demand, for recognition. The need, it can be argued, is 
one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics…
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or 
its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person 
or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, as the 
people or the society around them mirror back to them a confining 
or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.”43
In his discussion of the necessity of incorporating a healthy 
understanding of identity politics into the maintenance and growth of 
contemporary civil societies, Taylor argues for the need to recognize all 
legitimate and legal groups and to engage them in open dialogue without 
any political or social restrictions: “Equal recognition is not just the 
appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict 
damage on those who are denied it.”44 Similarly, Wolf (1994) warns 
against the nonrecognition or misrecognition of various groups: “The 
harms most obvious in this context are, at the least, that the members 
of the unrecognized cultures will feel deracinated and empty, lacking 
the sources for a feeling of community and a basis for self-esteem, 
and, at the worst, that they will be threatened with the risk of cultural 
annihilation.”45
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Simon Cottle (2006) offers an approach grounded in the “mediatized 
recognition” of oppressed or marginalized groups in order to better 
understand the role that media can play in the processes of cross-cultural 
reconciliation. Placing the concept of recognition at the heart of the media 
contribution to reconciliation, Cottle argues that the capacity of media to 
recognize isolated, denigrated, and discriminated cultural “Others,” on 
their own communicative terms, becomes central in determining how, 
when, and what function the media play in negotiating cross-cultural 
tensions. Moreover, expanding upon the deliberative necessities of a 
transcultural dialogue, Cottle points to the importance of new media to 
counter the “rationalist bias within much contemporary theorizing.”46 
Drawing from Iris Young, Cottle notes that new media – televised media 
in particular – are able to increase exposure to and acceptance of diverse 
methods of communication, like non-linear storytelling and performative 
communication, as well as to the distinct cultural meanings and values of 
perceived “Others.”47
While rarely discussed in the context of peace journalism, the 
concept of mediatized recognition may be helpful in explaining precisely 
how and why news media can play a constructive role in the cultural 
and political conflicts. For Cottle, media are a critical means by which 
cultural antagonisms can be outlined and negotiated in contemporary 
conflicts: “In today’s mediatized societies it is probably inevitable 
that the media will be seen as a key, possibly principal, means by 
which cultural differences and agendas can be publicly recognized and 
acknowledged.”48 Howard (2002), a more traditional peace journalism 
theorist, agrees, arguing that media that make an effort to provide equal 
recognition to all social and political groups, particularly the ones that 
have often been underrepresented and marginalized, can contribute to the 
peaceful integration of these groups into the overall structure of the civil 
society: “With this recognition emerges a journalism that is sensitized to 
conflict resolution techniques, and seeks to maximize understanding of 
the underlying causes and possible solutions.”49

 “Conciliatory media” is a term that we coined in this study and refers 
to news media that work to meet a number of criteria, outlined in detail 
below, when it comes to covering issues of collective social importance. 
By doing so, such media can deviate from the “war journalism” style 
that has dominated today’s post 9/11 mediascape and instead contribute 
to creating an environment that is more conducive to cooperation, 
negotiation and reconciliation. 
Research has shown that audience members will try to get more 
information from the media to enhance their understanding, particularly 
during times of conflict (see the section on media system dependency 
scale in Appendix 1). Therefore, we argue that a conciliatory media can 
help alleviate tensions grounded in stereotype and myth and enhance a 
global understanding of events in ways that encourage open-mindedness 
among audiences. “By making available space or air time for expression 
of grievances, the media encourage an essential part of the healing 
process. During the period of reconciliation and rehabilitation, the media 
can also serve to empower groups that had previously been voiceless.”50 
Echoing the same thought, Botes (1996) was cited in Aho (2004) as 
saying that “media are sensitive towards the task of promoting tolerant 
and diverse viewpoints.”51
Drawing from a case study of Australian media coverage of the 
Howard government’s treatment of illegal immigrants, Cottle isolates 
seven characteristics of media that best serve a conciliatory function: (1) 
“image to the invisible;” (2) “claims, reason and public argumentation;” 
(3) “public performance and credibility;” (4) “personal accounts and 
experimental testimonies;” (5) “reconciling the past, towards the 
present;” (6) “media reflexivity;” and (7) “bearing witness in a globalized 
world.”52 The first characteristic, “image to the invisible,” speaks to the 
capacity of a media to expose an event or act that had previously been 
“hidden” by governments and corporations. The “claims, reason and 
public argumentation” function is similar to that described by proponents 
of “deliberative democracy,” where public officials and opinion leaders 
describe and defend their decisions in the public sphere, opening them to 
challenges and questions. The third characteristic, “public performance 
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and credibility,” speaks to the ability of a media to interview or challenge 
a guest live, where the responses are de facto authentic, unable to be 
censored or scripted. Space for “personal accounts and experimental 
testimony” is important in that “former Others are enabled to put their 
individual experiences into the public domain,” conversations that allow 
for “stories and personal accounts of pain, suffering and injustice” to 
“fragment reductionist stereotypes of the collective Other.” Similarly, 
a media that creates space for communications that “reconcile the past” 
with an eye to the present “assist in the public process of acknowledging 
the deep trauma and hurt,” contributing “to an ongoing process of 
reconciliation and cultural accommodation.” The media reflexivity quality 
refers to a media’s ability to examine, praise and criticize both other 
media coverage, as well as one’s own, in a process that pedagogically 
encourages more critical approaches of media consumption among 
viewers. Finally, perhaps as a summary of the previous characteristics, 
a media’s ability to “bear witness in a globalized world,” where content 
focuses on the dynamics of historical and contemporary injustices, 
“can help dismantle historically anachronistic images of the Other” and 
change the “consciousness and politics of understanding that condition 
our responses and ability to interact with today’s globalized world.” 
Needless to say, Cottle proposes these characteristics as an ideal, arguing 
that the more media are able to approach news with such criteria in mind, 
the more effective the process of recognition is, and thus the higher the 
media’s ability to lessen antagonisms between different cultures.53
Utilizing the limited academic literature on peace journalism54, we 
developed an eleven-point typology of media that best serve a conciliatory 
function as follows:
1.  Providing a public place for politically underrepresented  
   groups.
2.  Providing multiple viewpoints on a diversity of controversial  
     issues.
3.  Representing the interests of the international public in general  
     rather than a specific group of people.
4.  Providing firsthand observations from eyewitnesses of      
     international events.
5.  Covering stories of injustice in the world.
6.  Acknowledging mistakes in journalistic coverage when     
     appropriate.
7.  Demonstrating a desire towards solving rather than escalating  
  conflicts.
8.  Avoiding the use of victimizing terms, such as martyr or pathetic, 
 unless they are attributed to a reliable source.
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9.  Avoiding the use of demonizing labels, such as terrorist or  
  extremist, unless they are attributed to a reliable source.
10. Abstaining from opinions that are not substantiated by    
 credible evidence.
11. Providing background, contextualizing information that
      helps viewers fully understand the story.
We argue that when a media organization embodies such characteristics, 
it can work towards debunking cross-cultural stereotypes, creating a 
general culture of tolerance, injecting a multicultural knowledge into 
the public sphere, and working to produce reconciliation among cultural 
antagonists.
While this is an idealized media form that can be hard to find in 
today’s mostly commercially driven media, it can be argued that the Al-
Jazeera English satellite channel has adopted many of the characteristics 
included in the conciliatory media typology and thus may prove to 
provide a conciliatory function when it comes to covering politically and 
culturally divisive issues. 
In this study, we explore whether AJE’s mission, identity, code of 
ethics and resources allow it to play a conciliatory role in today’s world 
which is governed by sensational coverage of conflict as mentioned 
before. Operating with vast resources, relative independence from 
market and geopolitical forces; boasting an exceptionally qualified staff; 
staying away from the “soundbite culture;” and having various bureaus 
strategically placed around parts of the world that have often been 
marginalized or neglected by the mainstream Western media, such as 
Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia; AJE is in an excellent position 
to enhance a greater understanding between various people and cultures 
around the world.  It is this potential of AJE to serve as a conciliatory 
medium that we have measured in this study.

 Al-Jazeera, which means “the island” in Arabic, was launched by Qatar’s 
progressive emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, in November 
1996, as part of his efforts to democratize his tiny state in the Persian 
Gulf. The Qatari emir “planned for Al-Jazeera to be an independent and 
nonpartisan satellite TV network free from government scrutiny, control, 
and manipulation.”55
The launching of Al-Jazeera followed the termination of a contract 
in April 1996 between Rome-based, Saudi-owned Orbit Radio and 
Television Service and the Arabic TV division of the BBC News Service. 
The contract termination resulted from a serious clash between the Saudi 
government and the BBC regarding editorial policies. It was reported 
that the Saudi investors decided to withdraw their financial support of the 
project following an argument over the broadcast of a documentary about 
executions in Saudi Arabia. After the failure of that venture, the majority 
of the BBC’s Arabic TV service editorial staff members were recruited 
by Al-Jazeera, which also inherited the BBC network’s editorial spirit, 
freedom, and style.56 This core group of newly recruited staff members 
received their training in a Western journalistic environment, and they 
were familiar with the Arab political environment, with all its nuances 
and intricacies – qualifications that made them “the final ingredient in 
the recipe for Al-Jazeera’s eventual success.”57
Today, Al-Jazeera has created a niche for itself by identifying a 
market demand for serious and independent journalism, with content 
mostly dedicated to political matters that are of key concern to the 
Arab people.58  In this context, Mohamed Zayani (2005) argued that Al-
Jazeera has capitalized on the fact that the Middle East is a region where 
politics plays a critical role in people’s daily lives to the extent that any 
social gathering or regular family reunion often revolves around political 
debates. According to Zayani, Al-Jazeera has been “providing food 
for an audience that is hungry for credible news and serious political 
analysis.”59
Al-Jazeera’s viewers, who were initially shocked by the courageous 
approach and independent editorial style of the channel’s talk shows, 
have become used to controversial confrontations, contentious views 
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and loud debates, “with Islamists and anti-Islamists pitted against 
each other, as well as people of all political persuasions and dissidents 
from Morocco to Egypt and Palestine to Bahrain.”60 Al-Jazeera’s talk 
shows “often set the agenda for local arguments and debates, as well as 
reflecting the issues considered important among the Arab intellectual 
elite. And its talk shows have been far more free, controversial, live, and 
uncensored than those of most of its competitors.”61  For Arab television 
viewers, who have been longing for such talk shows, which they can use 
to listen to controversial opinions as well as express their views without 
inhibitions, Al-Jazeera has been a breath of fresh air in a heavily censored 
environment.
It was no surprise that Al-Jazeera’s talk shows would infuriate most 
Arab governments’ officials, who were not accustomed to seeing an Arab 
television station hold them accountable for their actions, challenge their 
policies, or take a line that is contradictory to their agendas. Outrage with 
Al-Jazeera took different forms: many countries sent official complaints 
to Qatar. In fact, more than 450 complaints were received by Qatari 
diplomats from various Arab states during the first few years following 
the start of Al-Jazeera.62  “Arab ambassadors to [the Qatari capital] 
Doha said they spent so much time complaining about Al-Jazeera that 
they felt more like ambassadors to a TV channel than ambassadors to a 
country.”63
Since its launch, Al-Jazeera has created a vibrant and dynamic 
political environment that has liberalized the Arab media discourse and 
positively impacted political debates. This impact has been described as 
the “Al-Jazeera effect,” which refers to Al-Jazeera’s role in “providing 
an unprecedented forum for debate in the Arab world that is eviscerating 
the legitimacy of the Arab status quo and helping to build a radically new 
pluralist political culture.”64 Commenting on the “Al-Jazeera effect,” the 
Egyptian political activist Saad al-Din Ibrahim was quoted by Lynch 
(2005) as saying: “Al-Jazeera has done probably for the Arab world 
more than any organized critical movement could have done, in opening 
up the public space, in giving Arab citizens a newly found opportunity 
to assert themselves.”65
Along the same lines, Zayani (2005) argued that Al-Jazeera has led to 
a “growing realization that Arab public opinion matters…Al-Jazeera is 
broadening the form, content and extent of public involvement. As there 
are more interactive programs [on Al-Jazeera], there are more people 
who call in to express their views and more viewers who are exposed to 
such a diversity of views…[This makes Al-Jazeera viewers] more than 
mere passive recipients.”66
The open environment that is made possible thanks to Al-Jazeera’s 
interactive talk shows can encourage political efficacy and facilitate 
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political mobilization. Al-Jazeera, by opening new venues for freedom 
of expression and providing a platform for dialogue, can affect the Arab 
public discourse. In this context, Dale Eickelman (2002) argues that Arab 
satellite channels, particularly Al-Jazeera, have the ability to substitute 
for what he called the “democracy deficit” which characterizes the 
Arab world. According to Eickelman, the uncensored information that 
is disseminated by a network like Al-Jazeera helps shape Arab public 
opinion, which in turn “pushes Arab governments to be more responsive 
to their citizens, or at least to say that they are.”67
Echoing the same thought, Lynch (2006) argues that Al-Jazeera talk 
shows have contributed to creating a “new [more politically savvy Arab] 
public [which in turn] has forced Arab leaders to justify their positions far 
more than ever before, introducing a genuinely new level of accountability 
to Arab politics. By focusing relentlessly on the problems facing the Arab 
status quo – social, cultural, and political – it has generated a sense of 
urgency for change that had long been lacking.”68
Yet, while it is clear that Al-Jazeera has changed Arab media and 
political discourse permanently, it is unclear if such an “Al-Jazeera 
effect” can be replicated or used as evidence of the enhanced impact 
that broadcast media have on public opinion en masse.  Al-Jazeera’s 
influence in the region is tied to a number of specific historical and 
cultural conditions that provided a backdrop emphasizing the magnitude 
of change that Al-Jazeera has presented compared to the Arab status 
quo.  In a region notorious for obstructing the freedom of press, and 
a historically significant sense of regional identity, Al-Jazeera has both 
challenged unpopular regimes and policies while reigniting feelings of 
collective influence amongst publics throughout the region.  Thus, while 
it is important to outline the importance that Al-Jazeera had at the turn of 
the century, this importance is perhaps better understood as a symbol for 
the changed dynamics of communication and power in today’s globalized 
society rather than a testament to the influence of the broadcast media. 

Al-Jazeera English (AJE), a subsidiary of Qatar’s Al-Jazeera Arabic 
network, represents a new form of transnational media that has the 
declared purpose of revolutionizing the global newscape. Launched on 
November 15, 2006, AJE -- “is the world’s first global English language 
news channel to be headquartered in the Middle East”69 -- is already 
accessible in over 110 million households worldwide, and has also 
agreed to provide distribution (oftentimes free of charge) via multiple 
video sharing websites, making it accessible to anyone with a connection 
to the World Wide Web.  With over 25 bureaus worldwide, AJE is 
touted as “the voice of the South.”  Ibrahim Helal (2008), AJE’s deputy 
manager for news and programmes, explains: “The ‘South’ here is not 
meant to be geographical. It is symbolic. It is a lifestyle because in the 
West, you have a lot of South as well. In Britain, you have South. In 
Europe, you have South. The South denotes the voiceless in general.” 
The network promises that it contains the technological capacity and the 
ideological wherewithal to provide new and productive fora for cross-
cultural communications.
According to its proponents, AJE presents a tremendous opportunity 
for a new direction in the discourse of global news flow. With its 
avowed promise of giving a “voice to the voiceless,” AJE’s launch and 
growing popularity represent a new style of media structure and content 
that provides an important test case for existing research regarding 
transnational media organizations and media and conflict scholarship 
more broadly.
When asked about what the AJE brand meant to him, Scott Furgeson, 
AJE’s director of programming, said: “It means independence. It means 
alternative opinion. It means voice of the voiceless. If you’re a journalist 
and you’re a broadcaster and you’re interested in that sort of a subject, 
this is the place to be.”71 Along the same lines, Veronica Pedrosa, an 
AJE presenter in Kuala Lumpur, said: “AJE is somewhat freer to report 
without a kind of projection of who its viewer is. It’s not just concerned 
with viewership and ratings as CNN and BBC worldwide. Just because it 
is funded by the government of Qatar as opposed to being commercially-
driven, it doesn’t have stockholders it needs to answer to. And also it’s 
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trying to prove itself. I remember that in my job interview for my current 
position, I asked my boss: ‘So if you’re not worried about viewers, if 
you’re not worried about money, what is going to be the gauge of your 
success?’ And he told me at the time, ‘well, high quality journalism.’”72
Nahedah Zayed, AJE news editor at the Washington, D.C. bureau, 
reflecting on her experience at AJE compared to several other major 
news broadcasters, suggested that AJE provides a voice for the voiceless 
not only by covering stories that have been underrepresented in the 
traditional mainstream media, but also through the diversity of its staff: 
“We are so diverse and so varied and it just gives you a sense of yes, 
that’s the voice of the voiceless.  I see people from Africa.  I see people 
from the jungles of Brazil.  Indigenous Indians in Bolivia. Palestinians in 
the West Bank.  You are not going to see it anywhere else.”73
Addressing AJE’s mission, Nigel Parsons, the former AJE managing 
director, said: “This was a chance, a blank piece of paper to do things 
differently. And I do think that we have shaken up a very tired old 
industry. I do think we have raised the bar. Everyone said that there was 
nothing different to do or be done. I think to a large measure that we have 
achieved what we have set out to do. We do provide more analysis. We 
do provide more depth. We do cover untold stories.”74
Serving as a “voice to the voiceless” is a concept that is unfamiliar 
amongst many Western news media networks. In this context, AJE’s 
Helal, said: “The AJE way of journalism is a bit different from the West 
because we tend to go faster to the story and to go deeper into communities 
to understand the stories, rather than getting the [news] services to give 
us the information… We try to do our best to set the agenda by searching 
for stories others cannot reach or don’t think of.”75 According to Helal, 
the nature of AJE stories and the angles they focus on contribute to their 
standing out as a network compared to Western television stations. “We 
were in Myanmar exclusively during the tensions last year. We covered 
Gaza from within Gaza by Gazan correspondents. We looked into why 
Gazans are united behind Hamas despite the suffering. These kinds of 
stories are not easily covered by other media. It’s not an accusation [against 
other media]. It’s about the elements of perceiving the knowledge, the 
know-how when it comes to covering the story and producing it. It’s 
not there in Western media, but we have invested in people by bringing 
more than forty ethnic backgrounds and nationalities represented in the 
staff.”76
Echoing the same thought, Sue Philips, AJE’s former London bureau 
chief who currently coordinates the efforts of AJE’s international bureaus, 
said, “AJE provides an alternative voice on an alternative screen. You 
would turn to AJE to see the latest developments in Somalia, Darfur, 
Niger, in Asia, in South America… It’s the global picture that [Al-Jazeera 
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English] is providing…We cover more of the developing world than other 
organizations. We re-visit places. We don’t pop in for ten minutes or 
parachute in. We use nationals in each country to report on their country. 
This, we feel, provides our viewers with a better understanding of the 
culture, of the languages, etc.”77
Early research on the content, ideological underpinnings and 
operation of AJE all indicate that its approach to and production of 
news differ significantly from that of other major transnational media 
organizations like CNN International and BBC World. Content analysis 
points to a repeated and thorough effort at producing programming that 
has more depth than most contemporary televised news, as well as an 
agenda that emphasizes issues of particular importance to those living 
outside the post-industrialized Western world.78
Originating from the “Global South,” AJE demonstrates what Naomi 
Sakr (2007) describes as a “contra-flow” action. Sakr cites Sinclair et al’s 
(1996) definition of contra-flow as a situation where “…countries [that 
were] once considered clients of media imperialism have successfully 
exported their output into the metropolis.”79  According to Sakr, “contra-
flow in its full sense would seem to imply not just reversed or alternative 
media flows, but a flow that is also counter-hegemonic. Theories of 
hegemony suggest that counter-hegemonic media practices are liable 
either to be incorporated into dominant structures or marginalized in a 
way that neutralizes the threat they pose to the status quo.”80 Addressing 
the counter-hegemonic issue, Waddah Khanfar, Al-Jazeera’s director 
general, told the authors: “Our philosophy of reporting is human sentiment 
paradigm rather than the power center. We shift away from the power. 
Actually, our relationship with power is always to question power, rather 
than to give power more domain to control.  We have to empower the 
voiceless, rather than to empower the pulpit… or the powerful only.”81
AJE has a news agenda that aims at “redressing global imbalances 
in the flow of information.”82 According to AJE’s former managing 
director, Nigel Parsons, AJE is “the first news channel based in the 
Mideast to bring news back to the West.”83  Moreover, AJE focuses less 
on “breaking news,” oftentimes of little significance to a majority of the 
world’s citizens, and the “soundbite culture” that characterizes many of 
its Western counterparts. News items on AJE “are generally longer and 
snappier [than its Western counterparts] while documentary-style shows 
abound…its stories seem to introduce more angles than would be the 
case with ‘conventional’ all-news networks.”84
With an initial budget of over U.S. $1 billion, mostly coming from 
the emir of Qatar, AJE has opened up four broadcasting centers (in Qatar, 
the UK, Malaysia and the United States) and 21 supporting bureaus in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia, parts of the world that have often been 
34      hiStory of Al-jAzeerA engliSh
marginalized or altogether neglected by the mainstream Western media. 
Thanks to its sizable and remarkably market-independent resources, 
AJE is not subject to the economic pressures that have resulted in 
a decline in the quality of the many Western media.85 Even the BBC 
World Service, though publicly funded via a grant-in-aid by the UK’s 
foreign and Commonwealth Office, relies on some commercially viable 
programming to sustain its budget. According to Kieran Baker, AJE’s 
regional news editor for the Americas, “This station [AJE] may be the 
last bastion of public broadcasting.”86  Along the same lines, Naheda 
Zayed, AJE’s news editor in Washington, D.C. observes: “We are not 
driven by the dollar or constrained by commercialization pressures as 
many other news networks are. And this gives us great liberty in the way 
we approach our stories.”87
According to AJE’s Code of Ethics, AJE presents “diverse points of 
view and opinions without bias or partiality.” Moreover, it “recognizes 
diversity in human societies with all their races, cultures and beliefs and 
their values and intrinsic individualities in order to present unbiased and 
faithful reflection of them.” And it “acknowledges a mistake when it 
occurs, promptly corrects it and ensures it does not recur.”88 Moreover, 
AJE’s corporate profile further expresses its unique mission: “The channel 
gives voice to untold stories, promotes debate, and challenges established 
perceptions…The channel [sets] the news agenda, bridging cultures and 
providing a unique grassroots perspective from underreported regions 
around the world to a potential global audience of over one billion 
English speakers.”89 Given its aims, resources, structure and size, AJE 
provides a breath of fresh air and an interesting case study for examining 
the role of mass media in the negotiating cross-cultural conflict in the 
21st century. 
 RQ1: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their cognitive dogmatism?
RQ2: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their political tolerance?
RQ3: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their civic participation?
RQ4: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their cultural ethnocentrism?
RQ5: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ frequency of 
watching AJE and their degree of favorability toward U.S.:
Foreign policy in general•	
Cultural values•	
People•	
War on Terror•	
Policy in Iraq•	
Policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict•	
Brands and products•	
RQ6:  Is there a relationship between the respondents’ level of dependence 
on particular media outlets (namely AJE, CNN International and BBC 
World) as sources for following global news and determining political 
behavior and their degree of favorability toward U.S.:
Foreign policy in general•	
Cultural values•	
People•	
War on Terror•	
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Policy in Iraq•	
Policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict•	
Brands and products•	
RQ7: Is there a relationship between the number of months that 
respondents have been watching AJE and their degree of favorability 
toward U.S.:
Foreign policy in general•	
Cultural values•	
People•	
War on Terror•	
Policy in Iraq•	
Policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict•	
Brands and products•	
RQ8: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ levels of dogmatism, 
political tolerance, civic participation and cultural ethnocentrism and 
the frequency of their discussing global news and politics with their 
interpersonal networks?
RQ9: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ level of dependence 
on particular media outlets (namely AJE, BBC World and CNN 
International) as sources for following global news and determining 
political behavior and their perception of the urgency of the following 
global issues:
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict•	
The situation in Iraq•	
Terror threats in Europe and the U.S.•	
The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan•	
The spread of HIV and other infectious diseases•	
Global climate change•	
RQ10: Do respondents consider AJE a conciliatory medium?
RQ11: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ educational level 
and their levels of dogmatism, political tolerance, civic participation and 
cultural ethnocentrism?
RQ12: Is there a relationship between respondents’ educational level and 
the level of dependence on particular media outlets (namely AJE, BBC 
World and CNN International) as sources for following global news and 
determining political behavior?
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RQ13: Is there a relationship between the number of months that 
respondents have been watching AJE and their levels of:
Cognitive dogmatism•	
Political tolerance•	
Civic participation•	
Cultural ethnocentrism•	
RQ14: Are there differences among respondents in the six countries 
included in this study with regard to their levels of:
Cognitive dogmatism•	
Political tolerance•	
Civic participation•	
Cultural ethnocentrism•	

 In order to evaluate AJE’s performance and to answer the research 
questions, we conducted a multi-level method examining AJE as an 
organization, as well as its audiences in 6 different countries. To evaluate 
AJE as an organization, over 25 qualitative, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with members of its journalistic, editorial and administrative 
staff.  These interviews took place at each of the channel’s main 
broadcasting bureaus: Doha, Washington D.C., London, Kuala Lumpur, 
as well as in Jakarta.  To evaluate AJE’s impact on its viewers, we 
conducted a cross-sectional survey90 on a purposive sample of AJE 
audiences91 in Malaysia, Indonesia, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Kingdom 
and the United States to analyze the demographics, worldviews, and 
cultural, political, civic and cognitive dispositions of viewers of AJE. 
A purposive sample is a type of non-probability sample that “includes 
subjects or elements selected for specific characteristics or qualities and 
eliminates those who fail to meet these criteria.”92 Purposive samples are 
not meant to be representative of the population. Drawing from existing 
research, the countries under study were chosen due to their relative 
levels of viewership as well as their ability to signify existing cultural 
perspectives in the context of growing resentment between the “Islamic” 
and “Western” civilizations. 
We distributed a paper questionnaire to the respondents. We hired 
research firms that identified AJE viewers and conducted the survey 
either through CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) or in 
person in Malaysia, Indonesia, Qatar and Kuwait. These research firms 
used existing achieved sample from both syndicated media surveys as 
well as free find/referrals. We distributed the questionnaires ourselves in 
the U.S. and the U.K. In the U.S., we distributed questionnaires in person 
mostly at the two main Islamic centers in Toledo, OH, (one of only two 
American cities where AJE is carried through cable; the other city is 
Burlington, VT). As for the U.K., we distributed the questionnaires in 
person at the two major mosques in central London. We thought that 
targeting mosques and Islamic centers in the U.S. and the U.K. would 
increase the likelihood that we identify respondents who are familiar 
with AJE and who have been watching it, particularly given that Al-
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Jazeera Arabic has been a popular channel among Arabs and Muslims 
in general. 
The total sample size surveyed was 597 participants, with approximately 
100 participants surveyed at each of the proposed locations. The survey 
focused on sampling existing viewers of AJE only, though the sample 
included participants who had both just started watching AJE as well as 
those who had been watching the channel since it was first broadcast. 
Accordingly, the survey data provides an empirical record of the numerous 
dispositions of viewers of AJE that are examined, relative to the participants’ 
dependence on AJE as a source of information, as well as how often and how 
long they had been viewing AJE, to test the possibility of AJE’s function 
as a “conciliatory media.” We also conducted focus group interviews with 
select groups of respondents that were used to help us contextualize some 
of the survey results. 
The survey drew from existing literature to measure several 
variables that were critical to answering our research questions.  In 
order to determine the levels of importance that AJE had on the opinions 
and attitudes of participants, compared to other international news 
broadcasters, we drew from Media System Dependence theory. In order 
to measure cultural, political, civic and cognitive dispositions, we drew 
from scales and questions to measure each participant’s level of: (1) 
cognitive dogmatism, (2) cultural ethnocentrism, (3) political tolerance, 
and (4) civic engagement. (Each of the scales is discussed in further 
detail in the appendices). Altogether, we theorized that each of these 
attributes could independently provide evidence of the success or failure 
of a “conciliatory media.”  Moreover, the survey asked questions about 
participants’ opinions of the United States culture, people and foreign 
policies, as well as their opinion of the relative importance of several 
issues impacting international communities (global warming and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, for example).
We used a Generalized Linear Model (GLM), using robust standard 
errors and adjusting for clustering by country as a method of analysis for 
most of our research questions. To determine the statistical significance 
of our findings, we set our alpha level at 0.05. “It is standard practice in 
mass media research studies to set the probability level at .01 or .05. This 
means that significant results of the study occur because of random error 
or chance only one or five times out of 100.”93
 
 The final data set included 597 questionnaires collected from respondents 
in six countries (107 from Indonesia; 107 from Malaysia; 101 from the 
United Kingdom; 104 from the United States; 118 from Qatar; and 60 from 
Kuwait). Included in this set were 409 males and 179 females94Among 
the respondents, 421 were Muslim (72 percent); 88 were Christian (15 
percent), 17 were Jewish (2.9 percent) and 59 were people of other 
religions.95
Scales’ Reliability:
Media System Dependency (MSD) Scale Reliability
This scale yielded high internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha)96 for 
all three channels (.85 for AJE, .84 for BBC World, and .89 for CNN 
International). A scale is considered reliable if it yields a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .65 or more. In this context, DeVellis (2003) argues that: “My 
personal comfort ranges for research scales are as follows: below .60, 
unacceptable; between .60 and .65, undesirable; between .65 and .70 
minimally acceptable; between .70 and .80, respectable; between .80 
and .90, very good; much above .90, one should consider shortening the 
scale…”97 The MSD scale for CNN had a mean of 10.93 and a standard 
deviation of 5.38. The MSD scale for the BBC had a mean of 12.62 and a 
standard deviation of 4.36. The MSD scale for AJE had a mean of 13.97 
and a standard deviation of 4.31.
Dogmatism Scale
A study by Shearman and Levine (2006) indicated that only 11 of the 23 
items on the original scale that they used remained in the final version for 
which they reported internal reliability. Included in these 11 items were 
statements such as: “There is a single correct way to do most things;” “It 
is important to be open to different points of view;” “I consider myself 
to be very open-minded;” and “Different points of views should be 
encouraged.”98 Thus, we scaled those 11 items as specified, and they 
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .84. This scale’s mean was 31.72 and its 
standard deviation was 9.87.
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Political Tolerance Scale
This scale yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .91. It is important to note that 
there were 152 missing cases for the political tolerance scale; of those 
missing cases, 65 were from Malaysia. Many Malaysian respondents 
considered the political tolerance scale to be highly sensitive and they 
were reluctant to answer it. This scale’s mean was 2.98 and its standard 
deviation was 2.48.
Cultural Ethnocentrism Scale
This scale yielded a Cronbach’s alpa of .65. This scale’s mean was 6.75 
and its standard deviation was 2.74.
Civic Engagement Scale
Cronbach’s alpha reliability for this scale was .70. This scale’s mean was 
8.57 and its standard deviation was 18.23.
Conciliatory Media Scale
A factor analysis test was conducted on this scale, and all 11 items 
on the scale loaded on one factor. So, it was “factorially pure.”99 The 
conciliatory media scale yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .93. This scale’s 
mean was 76.48 and its standard deviation was 16.37.
RQ1: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their cognitive dogmatism?
A generalized linear model (GLM) test, controlling for the respondents’ 
gender, religion and travel outside their country, showed a significant 
positive relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE and their 
cognitive dogmatism (p<.0001). In other words, respondents who were 
more dependent on AJE were more dogmatic. The regression coefficient 
for this relationship was .129. It is worth mentioning here that respondents’ 
dependence on CNN International and the BBC World yielded the same 
results in terms of having a significant positive relationship with the 
respondents’ cognitive dogmatism. (For CNN, p<.0001 with a regression 
coefficient of .639; and for the BBC World, p was .0006 with a regression 
coefficient of .308).
RQ2: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their political tolerance?
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A GLM test, controlling for gender, religion and travel, showed no 
significant relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE and 
their political tolerance levels (p=.519). The same results were yielded 
for both CNN International and BBC World.
 RQ3: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their civic participation?
A GLM test, controlling for gender, religion and travel, showed no 
significant relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE and 
their civic participation level (p=.332). The same results were yielded for 
both CNN International and BBC World.
RQ4: Is there a relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE 
as a source for following global news and determining political behavior 
and the level of their cultural ethnocentrism?
A GLM test, controlling for gender, religion and travel, showed no 
significant relationship between respondents’ dependence on AJE and 
their level of cultural ethnocentrism (p=.083). The same results were 
yielded for both CNN International and BBC World.
RQ5: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ frequency of 
watching AJE and their degree of favorability toward U.S.:
Foreign policy in general•	
Cultural values•	
People•	
War on terror•	
Policy in Iraq•	
Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict•	
Brands and products•	
We ran each of the different attitudes toward the U.S. as a separate 
dependent variable, while controlling for respondents’ gender, travel 
and religion. A GLM test showed a significant negative relationship only 
between the time spent watching AJE and the respondents’ attitudes 
concerning the U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
(p=.041). The regression coefficient was -.047. In other words, the more 
that respondents watched AJE, the less supportive they were of the U.S. 
policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Other items in this question 
did not yield significant results. 
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RQ6: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ level of dependence 
on particular media outlets (namely AJE, CNN International and the BBC 
World) as sources for following global news and determining political 
behavior and their degree of favorability toward the U.S.:
Foreign policy in general•	
Cultural values•	
People•	
War on terror•	
Policy in Iraq•	
Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict•	
Brands and products•	
A GLM test that included dependence on AJE, BBC World and CNN 
International to examine their comparative effects on respondents’ 
attitudes in this regard showed the following results: Dependence on BBC 
World and CNNI predicted support for U.S. foreign policy in general 
(For CNN, p=.0017 with a regression coefficient of .156; for BBC World, 
p=.0109 with a regression coefficient of .066). Dependence on BBC 
World predicted support for U.S. cultural values (p=.043; regression 
coefficient was .092). Dependence on CNNI predicted support for 
America’s War on Terror (p<.0001 with a regression coefficient of .236), 
the U.S. policy in Iraq (p<.0001 with a regression coefficient of .210) 
and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (p=.0004 with a regression coefficient 
of .267). However, dependence on AJE predicted lack of support for 
U.S. policy in Iraq (p=.0001 with a regression coefficient of -.118) as 
well as the U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (p=.026 
with a regression coefficient of -.279). None of the three networks tested 
were predictive of support, or lack thereof, for purchasing American 
products.
RQ7: Is there a relationship between the number of months that 
respondents have been watching AJE and their degree of favorability 
toward U.S.:
Foreign policy in general•	
Cultural values•	
People•	
War on terror•	
Policy in Iraq•	
Policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict•	
Brands and products•	
A GLM test that controlled for respondents’ gender, travel and religion, 
showed significant results only with the U.S. policy in Iraq (p=.015). 
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The regression coefficient was -.056. The more months that a respondent 
reported viewing AJE, the less supportive he/she was of U.S. policy in 
Iraq.
RQ8: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ levels of dogmatism, 
political tolerance, civic participation and cultural ethnocentrism and 
the frequency of their discussing global news and politics with their 
interpersonal networks?
Interpersonal networks in this study referred to friends and family. 
A GLM test showed significant positive relationship only between 
interpersonal discussion and cultural ethnocentrism (p=.0097). The 
regression coefficient was .054. In other words, the more frequent the 
respondents discussed global news with their interpersonal networks, the 
higher their level of cultural ethnocentrism.
RQ9: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ level of dependence 
on particular media outlets (namely AJE, BBC World and CNN 
International) as sources for following global news and determining 
political behavior and their perception of the urgency of the following 
global issues:
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict•	
The situation in Iraq•	
Terror threats in Europe and the U.S.•	
The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan•	
The spread of HIV and other infectious diseases•	
Global climate change•	
A GLM test that included media dependence on AJE, CNN and BBC 
World at the same time as predictors showed the following results: 
Dependence on AJE was predictive of the importance of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict while controlling for the other two sources (p=.014 
with a regression coefficient of .169). Dependence on BBC World was 
predictive of the importance of the situation in Iraq while controlling 
for the other two sources (p=.031 with a regression coefficient of .165). 
Both dependence on BBC World and CNNI were highly predictive of 
the importance of terror threats in the U.S. and Europe (for BBC, p=.016 
with a regression coefficient of .138; for CNN, p=.002 with a regression 
coefficient of .089). Finally, both dependence on BBC World and CNNI 
were predictive of the importance of global climate change (for BBC, 
p=.004 with a regression coefficient of .055; for CNN, p=.008 with a 
regression coefficient of .049).
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RQ10: Do respondents consider AJE a conciliatory medium?
The participants in this survey were asked to rate AJE’s success (or 
lack thereof) in performing each of the 11 functions mentioned under 
conciliatory media section on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 meant “not 
at all successful” and 10 meant “very successful.” The average of the 
respondents’ ratings of AJE’s success level when it comes to these 
functions was 7 with a standard deviation of 1.5.  Importantly, a GLM 
test, controlling for respondents’ gender, travel and religion, also showed 
that the more months that viewers had been watching AJE, the more 
they reported it was a conciliatory medium (p<.0056 with a regression 
coefficient of .335). 
RQ11: Is there a relationship between the respondents’ educational level 
and their levels of dogmatism, political tolerance, civic participation 
and cultural ethnocentrism?
A GLM test showed that higher levels of education were significantly 
related to lower levels of cultural ethnocentrism (p<.0001 with a 
regression coefficient of -.118) and higher levels of civic participation 
(p=.0023 with a regression coefficient of .485).
RQ12: Is there a relationship between respondents’ educational level and 
the level of dependence on particular media outlets (namely AJE, BBC 
World and CNN International) as sources for following global news and 
determining political behavior?
A GLM test showed that lower educational levels were significantly 
predictive of dependence on BBC World and CNN International (for 
BBC, p=.002 with a regression coefficient of -0.032; for CNN, p<.0001 
with a regression coefficient of -0.194).
RQ13: Is there a relationship between the number of months that 
respondents have been watching AJE and their levels of:
Cognitive dogmatism•	
Political tolerance•	
Civic participation•	
Cultural ethnocentrism•	
A GLM test that controlled for respondents’ gender, travel and religion 
showed that the more months that respondents reported watching AJE, 
the less dogmatic they were (p<.0066 with a regression coefficient of 
-.214). None of the relationships with the other scales were significant.
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RQ14: Are there differences among respondents in the six countries 
included in this study with regard to their levels of:
Cognitive dogmatism•	
Political tolerance•	
Civic participation•	
Cultural ethnocentrism•	
Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests were run since the variances were not 
the same among the countries. Each scale showed significant differences 
by country as follows:
For the dogmatism scale, Indonesia was significantly higher than any 
of the other countries. Malaysia and Qatar were both significantly higher 
than the U.S. and the U.K. Also, Kuwait was significantly higher than 
the U.S. For the cultural ethnocentrism scale, Kuwait was significantly 
higher than Indonesia, the U.K., the U.S. and Qatar. Qatar and Malaysia 
were significantly higher than the U.K, the U.S. and Indonesia. For the 
political tolerance scale, Qatar, the U.S. and the U.K. were significantly 
higher than Kuwait, Indonesia and Malaysia. For the civic participation 
scale, the U.K., Indonesia and the U.S. were significantly higher than 
Kuwait and Malaysia.

 Our findings present an interesting set of answers, and many more 
questions, in terms of understanding what role news plays in today’s 
global mediasphere. Our results can be organized into three primary 
findings: (1) viewers perceived AJE as fulfilling a conciliatory function, 
and the longer viewers had been watching AJE, the more conciliatory it 
was; (2) the longer a participant had been watching AJE, the less dogmatic 
they were in their thinking; and (3) consumers of the global media – 
the BBC World, CNNI and AJE – tune into broadcasters that provide 
information that affirms rather than informs their existing opinions. Our 
findings demonstrate a nuanced answer to the question of how much 
influence global news media have in the current media environment. 
While people today are likely tuning into news programming which they 
find helps them reaffirm their pre-existing opinions on current affairs, the 
news media – when they embody the principles of a conciliatory media 
– may be able to foster lower levels of dogmatism, and thus produce a 
latent but substantial media effect.
This latent effect can be applicable to AJE, which is still relatively 
new on the world media scene, and it has faced several major obstacles 
since its launch in November 2006, “not least finding a way into the 
U.S. market and resolving the tension in its editorial vision…But its 
supporters point out that CNN needed 10 years to bed down.”100 In this 
context, Barbara Serra, an AJE presenter in the London bureau said: “I 
think we’re a work in progress…,but I think we’re getting close to having 
a huge impact on the global news scene.”101
Primary Finding 1: Al-Jazeera English viewers found it to be a 
conciliatory media
Overall, viewers found that AJE was a conciliatory media, and the 
longer they had been watching AJE, the better they thought it was at 
fulfilling its conciliatory functions. Conciliatory media, a term introduced 
in this research project as mentioned above, was determined based on 
how good viewers thought AJE was at performing 11 functions. The 
eleven functions or characteristics were determined based on a review 
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of existing literature, including peace journalism research, and were 
discussed in greater length in the “Conciliatory Media” section above.
A conciliatory media can create space for the “mediatized recognition” 
of stories from groups that have been historically and/or are currently 
disenfranchised, a process that has been found to be an important step in 
the process towards reconciling cultural tensions.102  While not directly 
stated, this process of mediatized recognition is at the heart of AJE’s self-
prescribed mission, as well as to how many of its journalists feel about 
the organization’s work. Moreover, by providing more depth and context 
to its stories, as well as reasoned arguments on all sides of an issue, a 
conciliatory media is likely to induce more open thinking when it comes 
to considering other people’s perspectives. 
The participants in this survey gave AJE a high ranking (7 on a 
scale of 1 to 10 when it came to its performance of the 11 conciliatory 
functions). Importantly, the longer viewers had been watching AJE, the 
more they reported it was a conciliatory medium.  Thus, the finding 
that AJE was a conciliatory media is not likely to be based merely on 
perceptions of AJE, or its brand, but rather it is based on the experiences 
of actually viewing the AJE’s programming.
 An example of AJE’s ability to provide mediatized recognition 
came from an anecdote from AJE correspondent, Josh Rushing. Among 
other things, Rushing contributes a series called “War with Josh Rushing” 
that examines the consequences of war with a particular emphasis on the 
environmental, social, economic, and political consequences of conflict 
that are often overlooked. In early 2008, Rushing filmed an episode for 
his series titled “Journey into the Heart of Darkness,” where he joined 
a Vietnam veteran who had been charged with 9 counts of murder in 
the My Lai massacre on a trip back to My Lai, Vietnam. According to 
Rushing, this was the first time a U.S. soldier who had been found guilty 
by the military of crimes involved in the massacre had ever gone back to 
the My Lai. As Rushing described the experience: “We introduced him to 
a survivor, who was shot twice as an 11-year-old boy.  His whole family 
was killed, put into a hole and a grenade fired into the hole. Now he runs 
a museum there at the site.” The episode was not an effort to tarnish the 
record of the Vietnam veteran, nor was it to point blame on any particular 
person or organization. The episode was emotional but civil, creating a 
mediated space for the Mai Lai survivor to grieve publicly, in front of a 
soldier who was directly involved in the situation, while also allowing 
for the soldier to respond to the survivor’s grievances. According to 
Rushing, a former Marine himself:
“My question in this episode is how can normally good people -- 
because this is a cross-section of soldiers in the military, particularly 
if it’s a draft situation -- do such awful things.  They were shooting 
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eighteen-month-olds.  They were killing and raping in such a way 
that war does not justify.  There is no order in the military that can 
legally hold up to justify the things that they were doing. So that’s 
what we are looking at.  The psychological side of it.  The emotional 
side of it. I don’t care about the politics.”103
Similarly, AJE is known not only for focusing on the underreported, 
but also taking greater risks by reporting in areas that are otherwise 
dangerous or difficult to get access to by the mainstream Western 
international news outlets. Myanmar is a case in point. In 2007, after the 
ruling crackdown on its citizens, Al-Jazeera provided the most credible 
reporting from inside the country. According to Mark Seddon, formerly 
AJE’s main UN correspondent, in the midst of the Junta’s crackdown, 
AJE kept five correspondents in Myanmar. More to the point, AJE’s 
coverage was considered to be the most accurate and credible according 
to Myanmar’s citizenry. Demonstrating the point, Seddon recalls: 
“The British Ambassador to the United Nations actually requested 
to do an interview with us on Burma.  I asked him why and he said, 
‘Because we know from all of our various sources that people in the 
country are looking at the Al-Jazeera website as a source of news—
what’s happening in their country’.…The ambassador wanted to 
send a message.  He knew that the TV signals were going to be 
blocked but that the Internet might not be blocked.  He wanted to 
send the signal that the British were using all of their best offices…
to sign up for much tougher sanctions unless the generals release 
prisoners, set boundaries and get their tanks off the streets.”104
When asked if AJE had been successful at representing the political 
interests of underrepresented groups, Will Stebbins, the D.C. bureau 
chief for AJE, recalled the network’s coverage of the 2007 elections in 
Argentina, where AJE correspondent Teresa Bo caught on camera and 
interviewed several Argentineans who were systematically committing 
voter fraud for both of the major political candidates running for office. 
Despite the fact that English language news is not widely watched in Latin 
America, AJE’s coverage “caused a sensation in Argentina, had thousands 
of hits on YouTube, local Argentinean news stations downloaded it from 
the Internet and re-broadcasted it completely and the federal prosecutor 
in Buenos Aires contacted our correspondent and initiated a criminal 
case based on the show.”105 No other major international news network 
covered the story.  
AJE’s coverage of the treatment of minorities in Malaysia has also 
been quite telling. On November 10, 2007, large protests broke out 
in the heart of downtown Kuala Lumpur. Organized by BERSIH, a 
coalition of Malaysian opposition political parties and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) with the stated aim of reforming the electoral 
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process, up to an estimated 40,000 protestors came out in force in order 
to draw attention to complaints of government discrimination against 
minority communities and to call for an end to government corruption 
and for electoral reform. While the protests began as a peaceful endeavor, 
Malaysian police quickly tried to quash the protestors and to dissuade 
people from joining the demonstrations by using fire hoses and tear 
gas. The images were stunning, not only for international audiences, 
but especially for Malaysians. While the Malaysian broadcast and print 
media failed to cover the protests as anything more than a blip, Al- 
Jazeera English covered the protests live and in detail. While covering 
them, AJE correspondent Hamish MacDonald was himself physically 
affected by the tear gas, the consequences of which were jarring for 
anyone watching.
The images of the excessive force used against the protestors spread 
like wildfire. Independent news providers and bloggers posted links to 
AJE’s coverage, and more than 250,000 people watched it on YouTube.com 
during the first week after the protest. More importantly, a large number 
of Malaysians saw the images and debated the merits of the rally. The 
large-scale discrepancy between AJE’s ample coverage of the protests 
and the sparser coverage of the Malaysian—largely state-influenced—
media resulted in the Malaysian mainstream media’s “largest credibility 
crisis to date.”106 Moreover, despite an on-air scolding from the Malaysian 
Minister of Information, Zainuddin Maidin,107AJE continued to air video 
of the government’s heavy-handed tactics and was again highly critical 
of the government two weeks later during a new set of protests (which 
also turned violent due to excessive police force). Dato Manja Ismail, 
director of Malay publications for Media Prima, the state-run media 
conglomerate, argued that by exposing the way the ruling government 
was treating ethnic minorities, “AJE’s coverage of the protests changed 
how we cover sensitive political issues here. Before, we could not show 
such images, or tell such tales of government abuse. Now, if we don’t we 
will lose our audience to AJE. I’ve told the Minister of Information that, 
and he understands that things must change.”108
These stories dovetail nicely both with AJE’s mission to provide a 
“voice to the voiceless,” as well as our finding that viewers felt that it 
succeeded in providing a space for the mediatized recognition of abuses 
of power. Along these lines, when asked to elaborate on the potential 
benefits of focusing on the metaphorically “voiceless” communities, 
Marwan Bashara, AJE’s senior political analyst, said: 
“Where you start mobilizing people, as viewers, and they start 
listening to this… they start understanding that there is a global 
language, and that there is a global periphery and there are global 
power centers. And people start understanding that the suffering 
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in Mozambique or in Zimbabwe is very similar to what you are 
suffering from in India or Myanmar....And that’s why we’re global.  
We’re global not because of our satellite – we can get to everyone....
It’s because our themes and our coverage gets to everyone.”109
While a systematic content analysis is beyond the scope of this 
project, these stories, along with AJE’s reputation and mission, provide 
substantial context for understanding why participants felt that AJE was 
fulfilling a conciliatory function based on the criteria developed here. By 
examining international news through the lens of the South, highlighting 
abuses of power and connecting stories of the disenfranchised from 
around the world, “several important steps toward conflict resolution 
can occur: the [conflicting] parties may be educated about each other’s 
point of view; stereotypes are challenged; and initial perceptions can be 
re-evaluated and clarified.”110 Given that AJE is still a relative newcomer 
in the global mediasphere, the extent of its role in conflict resolution is 
yet to be seen, though this is a promising finding indeed.
Primary Finding 2: The longer viewers had been watching AJE, the 
less dogmatic they were in their thinking
The survey found that the more months a viewer had been watching 
AJE, the less dogmatic they were in their thinking. Dogmatism is 
defined as “a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and 
disbeliefs about reality, organized around a central set of beliefs about 
absolute authority which, in turn, provides a framework for patterns of 
intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others.”111  Previous research 
has demonstrated a positive correlation between levels of dogmatism and 
confrontational behavior in conflict situations.112 This finding was found 
to be significant amongst both participants who relied heavily on AJE as 
their primary source for information and political behavior, as well as 
those who were less dependent on AJE.  Moreover, the relationship was 
significant regardless of respondents’ gender, religion or travel outside 
their countries. 
In some ways, levels of dogmatism can be described as a gateway 
variable controlling the relative impact that new information – especially 
information provided via the global news media – can have on opinion 
and behavior formation: “The relatively closed nature of high-dogmatic 
individuals’ cognitive systems leads to the processing of information in 
a way that ignores, minimizes, or avoids inconsistencies in beliefs and 
attitudes. Low-dogmatic individuals, however, do not keep inconsistent 
attitudes and beliefs isolated or separated, and the open nature of their 
cognitive systems allows them to see connections between belief and 
disbelief systems.”113 Thus, the lower levels of dogmatism associated with 
AJE viewership may open up viewers to become increasingly capable 
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of navigating issues that have otherwise been seen as irreconcilable. 
Moreover, lower levels of dogmatism have been found to strongly relate 
to one’s willingness to engage and listen to competing information 
claims, a consequence that could be exceptionally helpful in combating 
perceptions of a “Clash of Civilizations.”114
Importantly, while we did find evidence of an “Al-Jazeera effect,” 
it was limited to the cognitive level of thinking. By measuring the 
participants’ levels of cognitive dogmatism, this study provides a gauge 
of how individuals process information, without consideration of a 
particular issue. Here, dogmatism is seen as a variable “involved in 
the encoding and storing of information in memory and the processes 
involved in evaluation and judgment.”115 Thus, rather than the more 
rational or explicit behaviors and opinions that were asked in the survey 
(e.g. measures of political tolerance or feelings towards U.S. policy 
in Iraq), the dogmatism findings provide us with an authentic and 
important understanding of how people process information, particularly 
information that contradicts existing beliefs. As is briefly outlined 
above, levels of dogmatism are strongly related to how people behave 
in confrontational situations, as well as levels of political and cultural 
tolerance; thus we argue that AJE viewership may be able to positively 
impact viewers’ behaviors over the long-term.116
This is particularly significant in light of our finding that viewers 
considered AJE to be a conciliatory media, and that the longer a viewer 
had tuned into AJE, the better they thought it was at fulfilling a conciliatory 
function. Not only did viewers think that AJE was effective at embodying 
the journalistic standards that we identified as essential for a news outlet 
to cover contentious issues in socially productive ways, but the longer 
they watched, the less dogmatic they became, thus providing evidence 
that the concept of a conciliatory media can have tangible consequences 
on how people approach difficult issues.
Primary Finding 3: Viewers tune into international news for 
affirmation rather than information 
On a number of levels, the findings provided evidence that participants 
were tuning into international news media that they thought would further 
substantiate their opinions about U.S. policies and culture, and provide 
them with information regarding the international issues of concern that 
they felt should be priorities. 
First, the study found a strong relationship between the participants’ 
attitudes toward the U.S. policies and culture and the particular broadcaster 
they depended on for news and information. Participants were asked 
how supportive/unsupportive they were of: (1) America’s War on Terror, 
(2) U.S. policy in Iraq, (3) U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli 
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conflict, (4) purchasing American-made brands and products; as well as 
how favorable/unfavorable they were of (5) American cultural values, 
(6) U.S. foreign policy in general and (7) American people. Respondents 
who were dependent on BBC World and especially on CNNI were more 
supportive of U.S. foreign policy generally.  Moreover, those dependent 
on the BBC World were more favorable of American cultural values, 
while those dependent on CNNI were more likely to support America’s 
War on Terror. Finally, participants dependent on CNNI were more likely 
to support U.S. policy in Iraq and U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, while those dependent on AJE were more critical of 
both. 
Given that AJE brands itself on showing the “other side” of the war 
in Iraq and the oppression of the Palestinian people, these findings are not 
surprising. It is unlikely that a viewer who favors the U.S. policy in Iraq 
or toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would likely report him/herself 
dependent on AJE, especially given the Al-Jazeera network’s history of 
reporting on both those issues. Rather, these findings likely suggest that 
people seek out news media that reinforce their predetermined ideologies 
and opinions. In other words, viewers use the media to get affirmed rather 
than to get informed. So, for example, the viewers who oppose the U.S. 
policies in Iraq and Palestine may be more dependent on AJE as a source 
of information in that it will likely provide them information to further 
substantiate their already established opinion. Similarly, viewers who 
support the U.S. foreign policy may consider themselves dependent on 
CNNI since they believe its reporting operates along similar ideological 
lines to theirs. 
Similar to how viewers tune into particular broadcasters for 
information that will affirm their pre-existing opinions, viewers also 
seek out broadcasters that prioritize international issues that they 
are particularly concerned with. Thus, we found that respondents’ 
dependence on AJE, CNNI and BBC World was significantly related to 
how they perceived the urgency of various global issues. For example, 
viewers who were more dependent on AJE gave more importance to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict while those who were more dependent on 
BBC World and CNNI prioritized terror threats in the U.S. and Europe 
higher.
Strikingly, while viewers likely choose to watch international news 
broadcasters that will tell stories in ways that reinforce their opinions, 
we found that the more frequently participants watched AJE, the less 
supportive they were of U.S. policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Similarly, the longer participants had been tuning into AJE, 
the more critical they were of U.S. policy in Iraq. Thus, while the news 
media are unlikely to change one’s opinion on politically salient issues, 
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it may often be the case that they do reinforce and deepen already held 
opinions. These findings seem to provide strong evidence for Kai Hafez’s 
argument that the media appeal to their particular constituencies rather 
than to a universal audience. According to Hafez (2007), “When all is said 
and done, the mass media are not in the least oriented towards a ‘world 
system,’ but in fact concentrate upon national markets, whose interests 
and stereotypes they largely reproduce. Moreover, the influence of the 
media on politics is negligible, particularly in relation to international 
conflicts that touch upon vital national interests.”117 While AJE – given 
its cross-regional and global focus –  presents a challenge to Hafez’s 
suggestion that today’s news media concentrate on national markets, our 
findings do support the argument that people generally seek the news 
media that are more likely to reinforce their existing opinions of current 
events rather than challenge them. 
Findings from focus groups in Southeast Asia further substantiate 
this point. For example, a young Indonesian male said: “I don’t like 
[Western] news networks, such as Fox because they provide a very 
American perspective. However, I like AJE since it provides more news 
on the Middle East and the Gulf region.”118 Similarily, a middle-aged 
Malaysian male admitted: “When I heard of the launch of AJE, I thought 
that it would have a more fair representation of news that is important to 
me, compared to Western networks. Then, when I started watching it, my 
opinion about it was reinforced.”119
These findings present some interesting questions for theories of 
media influence. While the media system dependency (MSD) theory 
posits that media influence is determined by the “the scarcity or exclusivity 
of [an individual’s] information resources,” today’s over-saturated media 
environment means that it is rarely the case that people find themselves 
dependent on any particular media organization for information.120 
We live in a networked society where information is easily accessible 
and circulated across borders and time zones, largely eliminating the 
likelihood of situations where people are lacking sources of news. Yet, 
this study did find that participants still considered themselves dependent 
on particular sources of news (BBC, CNNI and AJE), despite the lack of 
information scarcity. Moreover, this study did confirm that dependence 
on particular media outlets was likely to correlate to (and we argue 
reinforce) the participants’ opinions on pertinent foreign policy issues, 
thus supporting MSD’s basic premise that dependence means influence. 
Thus, the new question becomes, when there is an abundance of sources 
of information, why do viewers become dependent on a particular news 
organization?
One possibility is that news has become a highly politically and 
ideologically charged topic, a condition that would alter the reasons why 
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someone tunes into a particular broadcaster. Bennett’s (2004) research 
has found that  “changes in citizenship may account for a large part of the 
difficulty in delivering standard mass society news format…to audiences 
whose members are increasingly parsing information in highly personal 
terms. This identity shift means…that news and information systems 
cannot simply go back in time to the seemingly rosier days of mass 
news audiences.”121 Hjarvard (2002) adds to Bennett’s assessment by 
arguing that in today’s highly competitive news environment, the degree 
of authority that was often allowed with the media of old no longer 
exists. Rather, similar to how consumers choose between competing 
commercial products, they rely on image and brand to determine which 
news organizations they trust. “The communication of a brand name 
plays a much more prominent role in global media, almost to the extent 
that the presentation of a brand name is equally important as relying on 
the brand name itself.”122 Thus, brands – and symbols associated with 
media brands – are the essential “landmarks” by which trust is gauged in 
today’s decoupled and decentralized media environment. 
Accordingly, Robinson (2002) argued that the media ought to be 
perceived as just one of several factors that affect political decisions 
rather than a main cause for such decisions. “Despite the radical claims 
of some, new communication technologies have not transformed world 
politics and media-state relations.”123
Beyond the questions regarding specific opinions of policies and 
culture, we also found no significant relationship between viewership 
or dependence on AJE, BBC World or CNNI and viewers’ levels of 
political tolerance, cultural ethnocentrism or civic engagement. These 
findings provide strong evidence showing that the mass media have 
no identifiable impact on determining people’s political and cultural 
behaviors and attitudes.
These results may provide further evidence of the changed role 
that news media have amongst today’s audiences. While media of old 
promoted cohesion amongst nation-states, or a national identity, new 
media have deviated from this tradition by moving towards the global 
level of analysis (and global audiences), and are thus best thought of 
as promoting “a cultural and mental urbanization.”124 An important 
difference between the traditional, nation-based media of old, and 
the new, culturally and ideologically aligned media of today is that 
today’s “media provide a different connection between social action, 
knowledge, and emotion. In the global metropolis, you can experience 
strong emotions and acquire enormous amounts of information, but this 
does not necessarily have any consequences at all in terms of subsequent 
social action.”125
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Thus, because of the changed social environment associated with a 
de-emphasis on national identity and the nation-state, the specific media 
effects of these new media have changed accordingly. Simply put, while 
national media systems represented some ties to the official nation-state, 
the public communication that was taking place has some association 
with action – changes in policy, for instance – that would take place. New 
media systems, decoupled from the nation-state, circulating the global 
airwaves, have no such similarity, and thus their association with public 
action is more complex. One result of such a decoupling has been the 
“aestheticisation” of communication, whereby knowledge and emotions 
become goals in and of themselves, separate from the sphere of social 
action.126
In this competitive environment, people’s levels of consuming news 
are decreasing, and when they seek news media outlets, they pick the 
ones that reinforce their views. However, this does not rule out the media 
potential to affect people’s cognitive level of thinking. The fact that the 
longer people watched AJE, the less dogmatic they became is a strong 
indication that the media can affect how people approach new issues 
where their opinions have not already been formed. What remains to 
be seen is how decreased levels of dogmatism from viewing AJE will 
actually impact viewers’ behaviors.
In this regard, we believe that the political situation on the ground 
may play a bigger role than AJE, or any other media outlet for that matter, 
in shaping people’s opinions, particularly when it comes to complicated 
and highly sensitive problems such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or 
the situation in Iraq. In other words, the news media by themselves are 
unlikely to have an immediate and drastic impact on viewers’ opinions 
as long as those viewers do not see improvements or changes on the 
ground.
This study provides tentative support of Nick Couldry’s (2006) call for 
the “transvaluing of media studies,” where he argues that media scholars 
jettison “the myth of the mediated centre and explore more openly how 
media are produced, circulated, received and (quite possibly) ignored in 
the contemporary social world.”127 Pointing out that the increased density 
in media flows does not necessarily translate into increased media power, 
Couldry calls on scholars to more critically evaluate the direction of the 
relationship between media consumption of public opinions. 
It is in this vein that this study cautiously approaches the conciliatory 
potential of AJE and its influence. In terms of news media today, AJE 
is an anomaly when it comes to its role, mission and identity. It stands 
out from its competitors in that it presents a challenge to the existing 
paradigms guiding international news broadcasters. It is neither 
dominated by geopolitical nor commercial interests, and is the first of its 
kind to have the resources, mission and journalistic capacity to reach out 
to ideologically and politically similar audiences throughout the world. 
It both represents a challenge to “the myth of the mediated centre,” while 
also providing a test case for examining whether the “increased density 
in media flows…necessarily translates into increased media power.”128
Addressing such issues is not entirely straightforward, though this 
study does shed some important light on the changing ways in which 
news media are consumed and processed amongst today’s media-savvy 
audiences. The three primary findings – (1) that viewers found AJE to be a 
conciliatory media; (2) that the longer viewers had watched AJE, the less 
cognitively dogmatic they were in their thinking; and (3) that people are 
likely to seek out news media that affirm rather than inform their opinions 
– offer a complicated answer to understanding the influence of the global 
news media today. For example, in an environment where people seek 
out news that affirms their opinions on important international issues 
and policies, what potential does the news media have in combating 
the myth of a “Clash of Civilizations?” Moreover, is it really the case 
that while news media are affirming pre-determined opinions, they can 
simultaneously be contributing to lower levels of dogmatism that may 
facilitate more open-mindedness when it comes to the many contentious 
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issues ahead of us? More research is required to examine the different 
impacts that the news media may be having at the cognitive, rational and 
behavioral levels of thinking.
Yet, it is clear that AJE is doing something right. Perhaps it is what 
Roger Silverstone (2002) describes as today’s news media’s ability to 
fulfill “the need to be heard.”129 As minorities around the world form 
diasporic communities in places far from their native environments, 
they have increasingly come to look toward global media systems as 
a means to connect with their homelands, hear and identify with their 
cultural kin, and to have their voices and interests represented in the 
global commons. Accordingly, today’s news media have moved towards 
the “personification of the message, targeting ideologically aligned 
audiences, regardless of nationality.130 In a sense, contemporary news 
media have come to function as a “re-embedding social mechanism, i.e. 
a mechanism that reconstructs and institutionalizes patterns of social 
interaction and thereby provides trust” in an otherwise increasingly 
fragmented world.131 This study’s findings confirm that people are drawn 
to news media that help them connect with others who share similar 
stories, a process that provides them with a sense of stability. Thus, 
in moving forward, questions of identity construction, promotion and 
identification are central to analyzing and understanding how media 
become trusted means for accessing information, and thus influential, in 
today’s media environment.
 Examining the role of media – and the influence of a particular media 
outlet – in conflict requires first and foremost a means of evaluating 
the importance of media in determining opinions and behaviors.  In 
order to best answer this question, this study relied on media systems 
dependency (MSD) theory to explore whether there is a relationship 
between the respondents’ dependence on AJE as an important source of 
news and their political tolerance, dogmatism level, civic participation 
and cultural ethnocentrism. We also explored respondents’ dependence 
on BBC World and CNN International for the sake of comparison with 
AJE.  MSD theory suggests that media are best viewed as an “information 
system whose powers vis-à-vis effects rest on the scarcity or exclusivity 
of their information resources.”132  MSD theory emerged as an effort 
and reaction to the two diverging trends in media effects research: one 
positing weak media effects (via uses and gratifications), another (via 
cultivation theory) arguing for the existence of strong media effects. 
MSD was an effort to reframe the research question away from whether 
or not the media has strong effects to asking “under what societal 
conditions do/don’t media have substantial effects?”133 MSD thus 
represents a nuanced approach towards understanding the relationship 
between media and power, focusing exclusively on neither the micro or 
macro levels, but rather aiming to develop a multi-level understanding 
of media power that could account for the occurrence of both weak and 
strong media effects at the level of the individual and, more broadly, 
society. Moreover, by reframing the question to focus on the specific 
environment conditioning the reception of media messages, MSD offers 
a more internationally malleable research agenda for determining media 
power across cultures and nations. Such an approach is of particular use 
in the context of evaluating the news media, where numerous external 
or environmental factors (fear, for example) can impact the power of a 
particular story or message. 
Both MSD and Uses and Gratifications (U&G) theorists depart from 
many traditional media effects theorists in that the audience is understood 
as an active and influential variable in the media-effects process. Yet, 
the particular ways in which the audience relates to media is a point of 
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significant departure. For U&G theorists, the primary question is how 
an audience uses media to satisfy particular needs at a given time, a 
condition that is largely influenced and understood at the individual and 
interpersonal levels. Contrastingly, MSD argues that there are significant 
constraints to the role these interpersonal networks play in the dependency 
relationship. Rather than focusing on an individual’s needs or uses, MSD 
suggests that human motivations and actions are better understood as 
goal-oriented, and that these goals (as well as perceived “needs”) are to 
a large extent shaped through social pressures that are largely outside 
the control of the individual. Accordingly, while U&G theories suggest 
that the individual’s ability to neutralize and even combat media power 
is substantive, MSD introduces a number of variables that challenge 
the rather optimistic hopes of many U&G theorists. While media texts 
are vulnerable to reinterpretation and reappropriation by individuals, 
MSD contends that media systems’ ability to control structural and 
informational resources in expansive ways contribute to their “powerful 
knowledge construction position at macrolevels,” a condition that “is 
likely to extend to microlevels.”134 Accordingly, U&G theories fail to 
take into account not only the constraining effects that media institutions 
have at the macro level, but also the consequences that these macro 
conditions have on the normalization of particular social knowledge(s) 
at the individual and interpersonal levels.
MSD’s multilevel, ecological approach offers scholars a method 
to examine not only the importance of interpersonal networks in 
understanding news media influence, but also the social contexts in 
which interpersonal relationships and individuals’ dependence on 
media systems may be impacted. The central organizing concept is 
the “micro-MSD relation,” defined as “the extent to which attainment 
of individual’s goals is contingent upon access to the information and 
resources of the media system, relative to the extent to which attainment 
of the media system’s goals is contingent upon the resources controlled 
by individuals.”135 For example, drawing from much of Adorno’s (and 
others) work, MSD suggests that people’s “intolerance of ambiguity” is a 
critical psychological condition that most strive to alleviate or reconcile.136 
Accordingly, in situations of ambiguity, or where there are limited 
numbers of actors with information, the peoples’ dependence on media 
systems increase. Conditions of ambiguity, alienation, and disorder, or as 
Ball-Rokeach (In Preparation) describes, “problematic social environs,” 
are critical social circumstances that dramatically influence the level of 
dependence on media systems and thus the intensity and scope of media 
effects.137
Under such conditions, the audience members’ dependence on the 
media is a direct result of “the reduced adequacy of their established 
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social arrangements and the media’s capacity to acquire and transmit 
information that facilitates reconstruction of arrangements.”138
The MSD scale that we used in our survey consists of two questions 
measuring the extent of dependence on AJE, CNN International and BBC 
World as sources for following global news and determining political 
behavior.

 AJE’s mission, code of ethics and the testimonies of its staff members 
indicate that the network is serving as a platform through which voices 
across the spectrum can express themselves and provide a plethora of 
information relevant to the ongoing conflicts that the world is witnessing 
today. AJE, by providing comprehensive, in-depth analytical coverage 
that goes beyond the “soundbite culture,” as claimed by its staff 
members, can facilitate what Wolfsfeld (2004) referred to as a “rational 
public debate”139 among its viewers in a way that can reduce their 
dogmatism level and enhance their understanding and open-mindedness 
in approaching the issues and conflicts being covered.
Dogmatism is defined as “a relatively closed cognitive organization 
of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, organized around a central set of 
beliefs about absolute authority which, in turn, provides a framework for 
patterns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others.”140 Research 
shows a positive correlation between dogmatism and confrontational 
behavior in conflict situations.141
Rokeach (1960) defined the belief system as a representation of “all 
the beliefs, sets, expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious and unconscious, 
that a person at a given time accepts as true of the world he lives in.”142 
He also defines the disbelief system as containing “all the disbeliefs, 
sets, expectancies, conscious and unconscious, that, to one degree or 
another, a person at a given time rejects as false.”143 Rokeach (1960) 
assumes that an individual’s reliance on authority would “range from 
rational, tentative reliance…at one extreme to arbitrary, absolute reliance 
on the other.”144
With these definitions in mind, Rokeach (1960) developed a 40-
item dogmatism scale that measured an individual’s cognitive tendency 
toward open-mindedness versus close-mindedness. “Individuals high 
in dogmatism are characterized by their tendency to compartmentalize 
and isolate their beliefs and disbeliefs. Alternatively, individuals with 
more open belief systems, or with low dogmatism, are characterized 
by their willingness and readiness to make a linkage between diverging 
beliefs.”145
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Rokeach’s dogmatism scale was criticized for being “lengthy and 
often impractical for research purpose.”146 and for becoming outdated. 
That is why we have decided to use an updated dogmatism scale version 
to measure whether there is a correlation between AJE viewing and 
dogmatism level. This updated 23-item scale, which was constructed by 
Shearman and Levine (2006), aims to measure four main characteristics 
of the dogmatism cognitive style: “the degree of open-mindedness versus 
closed-mindedness, the extent that an individual believes in a single 
correct view, the extent to which one rejects ideas or viewpoints that are 
[in] disagreement with one’s own opinion, and blind respect or excessive 
reliance on authority.”147
 AJE, according to its code of ethics and the testimonies of its staff 
members, has been serving as a “voice to the voiceless” and providing 
“equal recognition”148 to all parties involved in a conflict. It has also been 
exposing its viewers to a variety of conflicting issues and perspectives to 
be discussed in a public deliberation. “Those who engage in deliberation 
are forced to consider alternative perspectives, reconsider their own 
perspectives and ultimately form better reasoned opinions. An outcome 
of public deliberation is a clear understanding of all sides of a public 
issue.”149 Based on that, we explore whether there is a relationship 
between people’s dependence on AJE as an important source of global 
news events and the level of their political tolerance. In other words, 
we test whether AJE can play a conciliatory role by reducing political 
intolerance among its viewers. In this context, Scheufele, et al (2005) 
found that “exposure to everyday differences of political opinion may 
translate into an appreciation of the need to tolerate differences of 
political opinion among disparate groups within the larger society.”150
Tolerance reflects “a willingness to put up with those things that one 
rejects. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of 
those ideas or interests that one opposes.”151 The true test for tolerance is 
when there is opposition or disagreement with a certain group. “If there 
is no reason to oppose, then there is no occasion for one to be tolerant 
or intolerant....One is tolerant to the extent one is prepared to extend 
freedoms to those whose ideas one rejects, whatever these might be.”152 
In this context, tolerance “entails the willingness to extend civil liberties 
to adversaries.”153
Individuals can become more tolerant by being exposed to a variety 
of opinions and perspectives, not just through the media, but through 
their interpersonal discussion networks that serve as dynamic deliberative 
forums. Research by Knight & Johnson (1994) as cited in Scheufele, et al 
(2005) found that “individual discussion within a diverse [interpersonal] 
network results in members having to compromise between opposing 
points of view, which motivates individuals to reevaluate those issues 
where conflict occurs.”154
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In addition to media exposure and involvement in deliberative 
interpersonal discussions, research has shown that the educational level 
affects political tolerance. In this context, Bobo & Licari (1989) found 
that more years of schooling lead to greater cognitive sophistication, 
which can increase political tolerance. “In short, education changes 
cognitive style in ways that increase the likelihood of recognizing the 
importance of extending civil liberties to those we dislike.”155
In our review of the literature, we came across one scale that was 
developed by Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus (1982)156 to measure political 
tolerance. This scale, which is used in our study to measure whether 
AJE viewing affects political tolerance, starts with a statement asking 
respondents to identify the political organization or group that they are 
“least likely to agree with when it comes to public policy?” The scale then 
asks respondents about how far they would be willing to go to support 
this group’s civil liberties (teaching in a state school; running for public 
office; forming a lawful organization; holding a public rally; making a 
public speech; not having to be subject to government wiretapping). 
 In order to gauge how culturally ethnocentric participants in this survey 
are, the survey asked two questions regarding each participant’s opinion 
of the superiority of his/her own culture and her/his fear of “other 
cultures.”  The questions were taken from a 2004 Pew study that, among 
other things, surveyed the cultural values and opinions of international 
audiences.157
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 Research has shown that news media, particularly conciliatory or peace 
media, can play a role in audience members’ participation in civic 
activities. In this context, results from a study conducted by Norris 
(1996) as cited in Scheufele, et al (2005) showed that viewers of certain 
types of public affairs programming on television are more willing to 
participate in public forums and get involved in a variety of political and 
civic activities than those who do not view such programs.158
Civic participation can be defined as the “activities that address 
community concerns through nongovernmental or nonelectoral means, 
such as volunteering for building a homeless shelter or working on a 
community project.”159 Civic participation is part of “social capital,” 
which includes “those tangible substances that count for most in the 
daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social 
unit.”160 The type of people who volunteer to participate in community 
activities usually have a better understanding of the events going on 
around them and thus are more willing to listen to the other side with an 
open mind.
In this study, we adopted a scale developed by Zhang & Chia 
(2006) to measure whether there is a relationship between respondents’ 
dependence on AJE as an important media source and the level of 
their civic engagement. In this scale, respondents are asked about the 
frequency of their performing the following community activities during 
the previous year: going to a club/neighborhood meeting; serving as an 
officer of some clubs or organizations; serving on a committee for a local 
organization; and working on a committee project.
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 Please answer the following questions as truthfully and completely as 
possible.
Your identity will be kept entirely confidential and your answers 
anonymous.
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements:
a.    There is a clear line between what is right and what is wrong.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
b.    People who disagree with me are usually wrong.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
c.    Having multiple perspectives on an issue is usually desirable.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
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74      APPendix 6: Survey
d.    I’m the type of person who questions authority.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
e.    When I disagree with someone else, I think it is perfectly 
acceptable to agree to disagree.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
f.    I am confident in the correctness of my beliefs.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
g.    There is a single correct way to do most things.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
h.    People should respect authority.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
i. I am a person who is strongly committed to my beliefs.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
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j.    Diversity of opinion and background is valuable in any group or 
organization.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
k.    It is important to be open to different points of view.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
l.    My way is generally the best way to go.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
m.    I will not compromise when it comes to things that are really 
important to me. 
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
n.    There are often many different acceptable ways to solve a 
problem.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
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o.    I consider myself to be very open-minded.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
p.    Few issues lend themselves to either or solutions; rather there 
is usually a middle ground on most topics. 
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
q.    Different points of view should be encouraged.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
r.    People who are in a position of authority have the right to tell 
others what to do.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
s.    People who are very different from us can be dangerous.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
t.    I am “set in my ways.”
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
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u.    When I make a decision, I stick with it.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
v.    It is usually wise to seek out expert opinions before making 
decisions.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
w.    I like having a set routine.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
2. Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
3. Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.
Strongly 
Disagree
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree
Slightly 
Agree
Agree Strongly 
Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
4. How often do you discuss news and politics with your interpersonal 
networks (e.g. family and friends)?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often
0 1 2 3 4
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5. How do you feel about American cultural values?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all favorable   Very favorable
6. How do you feel about the U.S. foreign policy in general?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all favorable   Very favorable
7. How do you feel about the American people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all favorable   Very favorable
8. Please indicate how important each of the following media sources are 
for determining your political behavior, with 1 being not at all important, 
and 10 being very important:
i.    CNN International:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
ii.   BBC News:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
iii.  Al-Jazeera English:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
iv.   Regional satellite broadcaster (please specify): 
___________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
79 mediAting conflict:  Aje And the PoSSibility of A conciliAtory mediA
v.    Local news channels (please specify): 
___________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
9. Please rate each of the following six international issues with regard to 
your perception of their urgency (with 1 being the least urgent issue and 
10 being the most urgent issue):
a.    The Palestinian-Israeli conflict
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all urgent    Very urgent
b.    The situation in Iraq
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all urgent    Very urgent
c.    Terror threats in Europe and the U.S.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all urgent    Very urgent
d.    The conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all urgent    Very urgent
e.    The spread of HIV and other infectious diseases
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all urgent    Very urgent
f.    Global climate change
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all urgent    Very urgent
10. What political organization/group do you find yourself least likely to 
agree with when it comes to public policy? 
___________________________________________
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11. Should a member of the group you’ve identified in the prior question 
be allowed to: 
a.    Teach in a state school?
 i.  Yes  ii.  No
b.  Run for public office?
 i.  Yes  ii.  No
c. Form a lawful organization?
 i.  Yes  ii.  No
d.  Hold a public rally?
 i.  Yes  ii.  No
e.  Make a public speech?
 i.  Yes  ii.  No
f.  Be free from government wiretapping?
 i.  Yes  ii.  No
12. Please indicate how supportive you are of each of the following:
a.    America’s war on terror:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all supportive   Very supportive
b.    U.S. policy in Iraq:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all supportive   Very supportive
c.    U.S. policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all supportive   Very supportive
d.    Purchasing American-made brands and products:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all supportive   Very supportive
13. How many times have you performed each of the following 
community activities in the past year: 
i.    Gone to a club/neighborhood meeting ___________
ii.   Served as a leader of a club or organization ___________
iii.  Served on a committee for a local organization __________
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iv.   Worked on a committee project ___________
14. Please indicate how important each of the following media sources 
are for you in your efforts to follow global news events, with 1 being not 
at all important, and 10 being very important:
i.    CNN International
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
ii.   BBC News
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
iii.  Al-Jazeera English
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
iv.   Regional satellite broadcaster (please specify) _____________
______________________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
v.    Local news channels (please specify) ____________________
_________________________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all important   Very important
Please answer the following questions regarding Al-Jazeera English 
(AJE)
1. In an average week, how many hours do you spend watching AJE?
 __________ hours per week
2. In an average week, how many days in a week do you watch AJE?
 __________ days per week
3. How long have you been a regular viewer of AJE?
 __________ months 
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4. Compared to other televised broadcasting news networks, how does 
AJE rate in each of the following categories? 
a.    Providing a public place for politically underrepresented groups
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all successful   Very Successful
b.    Providing multiple viewpoints on a diversity of controversial 
issues
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all successful   Very Successful
c.    Representing the interests of the international public in general 
rather than a specific group of people
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
d.    Providing firsthand observations from eyewitnesses of 
international events
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
e.    Covering stories of injustice in the world
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
f.    Acknowledging mistakes in journalistic coverage when 
appropriate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 Not at all successful   Very Successful
g.      Demonstrating a desire towards solving rather than escalating 
conflicts
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
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h.    Avoiding the use of victimizing terms, such as martyr or 
pathetic, unless they are attributed to a reliable source
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
i.    Avoiding the use of demonizing labels, such as terrorist or 
extremist, unless they are attributed to reliable sources
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
j.    Abstaining from opinions that are not substantiated by credible 
evidence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
k.    Providing background, contextualizing information that helps 
viewers fully understand the story
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Not at all successful   Very Successful
5. What do you consider your current attitude toward the US foreign 
policy compared with the one that you had before you started watching 
AJE? 
Much 
worse Worse
Slightly 
Worse Same
Slightly 
improved
Improved
Much 
improved
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please answer the following demographics questions 
1. Your age:   ______ years   
2. Your gender:
i.    Male
ii.  Female
3. What is your religion?  
i.    Muslim
ii.   Christian
iii.  Jewish
iv.   Other (Please specify) ________________
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4. What is your nationality?  ____________________
5. How many years of education do you have? ___________________
6. Do you speak any languages other than your native language?
i.    No
ii.   Yes (please specify): __________________________________
7. Within the last year, how many times have you traveled outside your 
country? 
Never Once Twice Three times
Four 
times
Five 
times
 6 times 
or more
               
8. Have you ever traveled to the United States?
i.    Yes
ii.   No
9. How many American friends do you have?   ____________
10. How many years of education do your parents have?
Mother:  ________________
Father:  _________________
Thank you for participating in the survey! If you would like to learn 
more about the Al-Jazeera Research Project, please visit our website 
at ajerp.com.
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